THOUGHTS
OF
CICERO.
ON THE
FOLLOWING SUBJECTS,

I. RELIGION
II. MAN
III. CONSCIENCE
IV. THE PASSIONS
V. WISDOM
VI. PROBITY
VII. ELOQUENCE
VIII. FRIENDSHIP
IX. OLD AGE
X. DEATH
XI. SCIPIO'S DREAM
AND
XII. MISCELLANEOUS
THOUGHTS.

Newly TRANSLATED from the LATIN and FRENCH EDITION of the

ABBE D'OLIVET,

BY

T. HENRY, A. M.

To which is prefixed,

THE LIFE OF CICERO.

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AN

ACCOUNT

OF THE

LIFE and WRITINGS

OF

CICERO.

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO was born at Arpinum, now in the kingdom of Naples, on the third of January, in the 647th year of Rome, about 107 years before Chriſt. He was educated at Rome, under an eminent Greek maſter. Cicero's fa-

ther (a Roman knight, deſcended from Titus Tatius, king of the Sabines) encouraged by the promiſing genius of his ſon, ſpared no coſt nor pains to improve it by the help of the ableſt maſters. Having finiſhed the courſe of his puerile ſtudies, he took the manly gown, or the ordinary robe of the citizens, which in his time, it was uſual to do at the age of ſixteen: and being then introduced into the forum, was placed under the care of Q. Mucius Scævola the augur, the principal lawyer as well as ſtateſman of that age.

About this time, the peace of Rome being diſturbed by a domeſtic war, Cicero took the opportunity of making a campaign, and ſerved as volunteer under Sylla. He was conſtant in his attendance upon orators and philoſophers: reſumed his oratorial ſtudies

under Molo the Rhodian, who was one of the principal orators of that age; and is ſuppoſed to have written thoſe rhetorical pieces on the ſubject of invention, which he afterwards condemned, and retracted in his advanced age, as unworthy of his maturer judgment. He became the ſcholar of Philo the academic; ſtudied logic with Diodorus the ſtoic; and declaimed daily in Latin and Greek with his fellow ſtudents M. Piſo and Q. Pompeius, who were a little older than himſelf, and with whom he had contracted an intimate friendſhip. And that he might neglect nothing, which could any ways contribute to his perfection, he ſpent the intervals of his leiſure in the company of the ladies; ſuch of them at leaſt, as were remarkable for their politeneſs and knowledge of the fine arts: in which he ſhould be imitated and fol-

lowed by the learned and philoſophers of every age; ſuch ſort of converſe being indeed the beſt, I had almoſt ſaid, the only means of reforming that pedantry, and bruſhing off that ruſt, which men are apt to contract from a life of ſolitude and ſtudy.

CICERO had now run through all that courſe of diſcipline, which he lays down as neceſſary to form the complete orator; and perfectly accompliſhed, he offered himſelf to the bar at the age of twenty-ſix.

HE was twenty-eight years old, when he ſet forward upon his travels to Greece and Aſia; the faſhionable tour of all thoſe, who travelled either for curioſity or improvement. His firſt viſit was to Athens, the capital ſeat of arts and ſciences; where he

met with his ſchool-fellow T. Pomponius, who, from his love to Athens, and his ſpending a great part of his days in it, obtained the ſurname of Atticus: and here they revived and confirmed that memorable friendſhip, which ſubſiſted between them through life, with ſo celebrated a conſtancy and affection. From Athens he paſſed into Aſia, and after an excurſion of two years, came back again to Italy. This voyage of Cicero ſeems to be the only ſcheme and pattern of travelling, from which any real benefit is to be expected. He did not ſtir abroad, till he had completed his education at home; for nothing can be more pernicious to a nation, than the neceſſity of a foreign one. He had acquired in his own country, whatever was proper to form a worthy citizen and magiſtrate, and therefore went confirmed by a matu-

lity of age and reaſon, againſt the impreſſions of vice, not ſo much to learn, as to poliſh what he had learnt, by viſiting thoſe places, where arts and ſciences flouriſhed in their greateſt perfection: and he ſtaid no where any longer than his benefit, not his pleaſure, detained him. Hence at length he returned, not fraught with vice and folly, as we too often ſee it happen, (for undoubtedly he knew, that theſe were commodities which his countrymen abounded in at home, and that there was no occaſion in the leaſt to import them from abroad) but poſſeſſed of every accompliſhment, which could improve and adorn a man of ſenſe.

CICERO was now arrived at Rome, and after one year more ſpent at the bar, obtained in the next place the dignity of quæſtor. Among the cauſes

which he pleaded before his quæſtorſhip was that of the famous comedian Roſcius, whom a ſingular merit in his art had recommended to the familiarity and friendſhip of the greateſt men in Rome. The quæſtors were the general receivers or treaſurers of the republic, and were ſent annually into the provinces diſtributed to them, as they always were, by lot. The iſland of Sicily happened to fall to Cicero's ſhare: and that part of it, for it was thought conſiderable enough to be divided into two provinces, which was called Lilybæum. This office he received not as a gift, but a truſt; and he acquitted himſelf ſo extremely well in it, that he gained the love and admiration of all the Sicilians. In the hours of leiſure from his provincial affairs he employed himſelf very diligently, as he uſed to

do at Rome, in his rhetorical ſtudies. Before he left Sicily, he made the tour of the iſland to ſee every thing in it that was curious, and eſpecially the city of Syracuſe; where he diſcovered the tomb of Archimedes to the magiſtrates, who were ſhewing him the curioſities of the place, but who to his ſurpriſe knew nothing at all of any ſuch tomb. He came away from Sicily, highly pleaſed with the ſucceſs of his adminiſtration.

We have no account of the preciſe time of Cicero's marriage with Terentia, but it is ſuppoſed to have been celebrated immediately after his return from his travels to Italy, when he was about thirty years old. He was now diſengaged from his quæſtorſhip in Sicily, by which firſt ſtep in the legal aſcent and gradation of publick honours

he had gained an immediate right to the ſenate, and an actual admiſſion into it during life; and ſettled again in Rome, where he employed himſelf conſtantly in defending the perſons and properties of its citizens, and was indeed a general patron. Five years were almoſt elapſed, ſince Cicero's election to the quæſtorſhip, which was the proper interval preſcribed by law, before he could hold the next office of ædile; to which he was now, in his thirty-ſeventh year, elected by the unanimous ſuffrage of all the tribes, and preferably to all his competitors.

After the expiration of his ædileſhip he loſt his couſin L. Cicero; whoſe death was the more unlucky to him at this juncture, becauſe he wanted his help in making intereſt for the prætorſhip, for which he now offered him-

ſelf a candidate, after the uſual interval of two years, from the time of his being choſen ædile. However, ſuch was the people's affection and regard for him, that in three different aſſemblies convened for the choice of prætors, two of which were diſſolved without effect, he was declared every time the firſt prætor, by the ſuffrages of all the centuries. This year a law was propoſed by Manilius, one of the tribunes, that Pompey, who was then in Cilicia, extinguiſhing the remains of the pyratick war, ſhould have the government of Aſia added to his commiſſion, with the command of the Mithridatick war, and of all the Roman armies in thoſe parts. Cicero ſupported this law with all his eloquence in a ſpeech ſtill extant, from the roſtra, which he had never mounted till this occaſion: where, in diſplaying the character of

Pompey, he draws the picture of a conſummate general, with all the ſtrength and beauty of colours, which words can give. He was now in the career of his fortunes, and in ſight as it were of the conſulſhip, the grand object of his ambition; and therefore when his prætorſhip was at an end, he would not accept any foreign province, the uſual reward of that magiſtracy, and the chief fruit which the generality propoſed from it. He had no particular love for money, nor genius for arms, ſo that thoſe governments had no charms for him: the glory which he purſued was to ſhine in the eyes of the city, as the guardian of its laws, and to teach the magiſtrates how to execute, the citizens how to obey them.

It is remarkable of Cicero, that amidſt all the hurry and noiſe in which

ambition had engaged him, he never neglected in the leaſt thoſe arts and ſtudies, in which he had been educated, but paid a conſtant attention to every thing, which deſerved the notice of a ſcholar and a man of taſte. Even at this very juncture, though he was entirely taken up in ſuing for the conſulſhip, he could find time to write to Atticus about ſtatues and books. Atticus reſided many years at Athens, which gave Cicero an opportunity of employing him to buy a great number of ſtatues, for the ornament of his ſeveral villas; eſpecially that at Tuſculum, in which he took the greateſt pleaſure, for its delightful ſituation in the neighbourhood of Rome, and the convenience of an eaſy retreat from the hurry and fatigues of the city. Here he had built ſeveral rooms and galleries, in imitation of the ſchools and

porticos of Athens; which he called likewiſe by their Attick names of the academy and gymnaſium, and deſigned for the ſame uſe of philoſophical conferences with his learned friends. He had given Atticus a general commiſſion to purchaſe for him any piece of Grecian art or ſculpture, which was elegant and curious, eſpecially of the literary kind, or proper for the furniture of his academy: which Atticus executed to his great ſatisfaction, and ſent him at different times ſeveral cargoes of ſtatues, which arrived ſafe, as he tells us, at the port of Cajeta, near to the Formian villa. Nor was he leſs eager of making a collection of Greek books, and forming a library by the ſame opportunity of Atticus's help. This was Atticus's own paſſion, who, having free acceſs to all the libraries of Athens, was employing his ſlaves in

copying the works of their beſt writers, not only for his own uſe, but for ſale alſo, and the common profit both of the ſlave and maſter. For Atticus was remarkable above all men of his rank for a family of learned ſlaves, having ſcarce a foot-boy in his houſe, who was not trained both to read and write for him. By this advantage he had made a very large collection of choice and curious books, and ſignified to Cicero his deſign of ſelling them; yet ſeems to have intimated withal, that he expected a larger ſum for them, than Cicero would eaſily ſpare; which gave occaſion to Cicero to beg of him in ſeveral letters to reſerve the whole number for him, till he could raiſe money enough for the purchaſe.

Cicero being now in his forty third year, the proper age required by

law, declared himſelf a candidate for the conſulſhip along with ſix competitors, L. Sulpicius Galba, L. Sergius Catilina, C. Antonius, L. Caſſius Longinus, Q. Cornificius, C. Licinius Sacerdos. The two firſt were patricians, the two next plebians, yet noble; the two laſt the ſons of fathers, who had firſt imported the publick honours into their families: Cicero was the only new man, as he was called, amongſt them, or one born of equeſtrian rank. Theſe were the competitors; and in this competition the practice of bribing was carried on as openly and as ſhamefully by Antonius and Catiline, as it uſually is at our elections here in England: ſo openly, in ſhort, that the ſenate attempted, though unſucceſsfully, to give ſome check to it by a new and more vigorous law. However, as the election approached, Cicero's in-

tereſt appeared to be ſuperior to that of all the candidates; for the nobles themſelves, though always envious and deſirous to depreſs him, yet out of regard to the dangers, which threatened the city from many quarters, and ſeemed ready to burſt out into a flame, began to think him the only man qualified to preſerve the republick, and break the cabals of the deſperate by the vigour and prudence of his adminiſtration: "for in caſes of danger, as "Salluſt obſerves, pride and envy na-"turally ſubſide, and yield the poſt of "honour to virtue." The method of chooſing conſuls was not by an open vote, but by a kind of ballot, or little tickets of wood diſtributed to the citizens with the names of the ſeveral candidates ſeverally inſcribed upon each: but in Cicero's caſe the people were not content with this ſecret and

ſilent way, but before they came to any ſcrutiny, loudly and univerſally proclaimed Cicero the firſt conſul; ſo that, as he himſelf ſays, "he was not "choſen by the votes of particular ci- "tizens, but the common ſuffrage of "the city; nor declared by the voice "of the crier, but of the whole Roman "people." This year ſeveral alterations happened in his own family. His father died; his daughter Tullia was given in marriage at the age of thirteen to C. Piſo Frugi, a young nobleman of great hopes, and one of the beſt families in Rome; and his ſon was alſo born in the ſame year. So that with the higheſt honour, which the publick could beſtow, he received the higheſt pleaſure, which private life ordinarily admits, by the birth of a ſon and heir to his family.

In his conſulſhip he diſcovered Cataline's conſpiracy, and puniſhed his abettors. About this time Cicero bought a houſe of M. Craſſus on the Palatine hill, adjoining to that in which he had always lived with his father, and which he is now ſuppoſed to have given up to his brother Quintus. The houſe coſt him near thirty thouſand pounds, and ſeems to have been one of the nobleſt in Rome. It was built about thirty years before, by the famous tribune M. Livius Druſus; on which occaſion we are told, that when the architect promiſed to build it for him in ſuch a manner, that none of his neighbours ſhould overlook him: "but if you "have any ſkill, replied Druſus, con-"trive it rather ſo, that all the world "may ſee what I am doing." The purchaſe of ſo expenſive a houſe raiſed ſome cenſure on his vanity, and eſpe-

cially as it was made with borrowed money. This circumſtance he himſelf does not diſſemble, but ſays merrily upon it, that "he was now ſo plunged "in debt, as to be ready for a plot, "only the conſpirators would not truſt "him."

THE moſt remarkable event that happened in this year, which was the forty-fifth of Cicero's life, was the pollution of the myſteries of the Bona dea by P. Clodius; which, by an unhappy train of conſequences, involved Cicero in a great and unexpected calamity. Clodius had an intrigue with Cæſar's wife Pompeia, who, according to annual cuſtom, was now celebrating in her houſe thoſe awful ſacrifices of the goddeſs, to which no male creature ever was admitted; and where every thing maſculine was ſo ſcrupu-

louſly excluded, that even pictures of that ſort were covered during the ceremony. It flattered Clodius's imagination greatly, to gain acceſs to his miſtreſs in the midſt of her holy miniſtry; and with this view, he dreſſed himſelf in a woman's habit, that by the benefit of his ſmooth face, and the introduction of one of the maids, he might paſs without diſcovery: but by ſome miſtake between him and his guide, he loſt his way, when he came within the houſe, and fell in unluckily among the other female ſervants. Here he was detected by his voice; and the ſervants alarmed the whole company by their ſhrieks, to the great amazement of the matrons, who threw a veil over the ſacred myſteries, while Clodius found means to eſcape. The ſtory was preſently ſpread abroad, and raiſed a general ſcandal and horror through

the city. The whole defence which Clodius made, when, by order of the ſenate, he was brought to a trial, was to prove himſelf abſent at the time of the fact; for which purpoſe he produced men to ſwear, that he was then at Interamna, about two or three days journey from the city. But Cicero, being called to give his teſtimony, depoſed, that Clodius had been with him that very morning at his houſe in Rome. Clodius however was abſolved by thirty-one of the judges, while twenty-five only condemned him: and as Cicero looked upon himſelf to be particularly affronted by a ſentence, given in flat contradiction to his teſtimony, ſo he made it his buſineſs on all occaſions to diſplay the iniquity of it, and to ſting the ſeveral actors of it with all the keenneſs of his raillery. About a year after Clodius, who had been

contriving all the while how to revenge himſelf on Cicero, began now to give an opening to the ſcheme, which he had formed for that purpoſe. His project was to get himſelf choſen tribune, and in that office to drive him out of the city, by the publication of a law, which by ſome ſtratagem or other he hoped to obtrude upon the people. But as all patricians were incapable of the tribunate by its original inſtitution, ſo his firſt ſtep was to make himſelf a plebeian, by the pretence of an adoption into a plebeian houſe, which could not yet be done without the ſuffrage of the people. Cæſar was at the bottom of this ſcheme, and Pompey ſecretly favoured it: not that they intended to ruin Cicero, but to keep him only under the laſh; and if they could not draw him into their meaſures, or make him

at leaſt ſit quiet, to let Clodius looſe upon him. Cicero affected to treat it with the contempt which it ſeemed to deſerve; ſometimes rallying Clodius with much pleaſantry, ſometimes admoniſhing him with no leſs gravity. But whatever face he put outwardly upon this affair, it gave him a real uneaſineſs within, and made him unite himſelf more cloſely with Pompey, for the benefit of his protection againſt a ſtorm, which he ſaw ready to break upon him.

THE firſt triumvirate, as it has commonly been called, was now formed; which was nothing elſe in reality, but a traiterous conſpiracy of three of the moſt powerful citizens of Rome, to extort from their country by violence, what they could not obtain by law. Pompey's chief motive was, to get his

acts confirmed by Cæsar in his consulship, which was now coming on: Cæsar, by giving way to Pompey's glory to advance his own: and Crassus's, to gain that ascendancy by the authority of Pompey and Cæsar, which he could not sustain alone. Cicero might have made what terms he pleased with the triumvirate; been admitted even a partner of their power, and a fourth in their league: but he would not enter into any engagements with the three, whose union he and all the friends of the republick abhorred. Clodius in the mean time had been pushing on the business of his adoption, which at last he effected; and began soon after to threaten Cicero with all the terrors of his tribunate, to which he was now chosen without any opposition. Cæsar's whole aim in this affair, was to subdue Cicero's spirit,

and diſtreſs him ſo far, as to force him to a dependence upon him: for which end, while he was privately encouraging Clodius to purſue him, he was propoſing expedients to Cicero for his ſecurity. But though his fortunes ſeemed now to be in a tottering condition, and his enemies to gain ground daily upon him, yet he was unwilling to owe the obligation of his ſafety to any man, and much more to Cæſar, whoſe deſigns he always ſuſpected, and whoſe meaſures he never approved. This ſtiffneſs in Cicero ſo exaſperated Cæſar, that he reſolved immediately to aſſiſt Clodius with all his power to oppreſs him: while Pompey all the while was giving him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, confirmed by oaths and vows, that there was no danger, and that he would ſooner be killed himſelf, than ſuffer him to be hurt. Clodius in the mean time was o-

bliging the people with ſeveral new laws, contrived chiefly for their advantage; the deſign of all which was only to introduce, with a better grace, the ground-plot of the play, the baniſhment of Cicero: which was now directly attempted by a ſpecial law, importing, that whoever had taken the life of a citizen uncondemned and without a trial, ſhould be prohibited from fire and water. Tho' Cicero was not named, yet he was marked out by the law: his crime was, the putting Catiline's accomplices to death; which, though not done by his ſingle authority, but a general vote of the ſenate, was alledged to be illegal, and contrary to the liberties of the people. Cicero, finding himſelf thus reduced to the condition of a criminal, changed his habit upon it, as was uſual in the caſe of a publick impeachment; which however was an haſty and inconſiderate ſtep, and helped to precipi-

tate his ruin. He was not named in the law, nor perſonally affected with it: the terms of it were general and ſeemingly juſt, reaching only to thoſe, who had taken the life of a citizen illegally: whether this was his caſe, or not, was not the point in iſſue, but to be the ſubject of another trial. He was ſenſible of his error, when it was too late; and oft reproaches Atticus, that being a byſtander, and leſs heated in the game than himſelf, he ſhould ſuffer him to make ſuch blunders. The tide however bore hard againſt him. Cæſar, though he affected great moderation, was ſecretly againſt him: Pompey, who had hitherto given him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of his friendſhip, began now, as the plot ripened towards a criſis, to grow cool and reſerved, and at laſt flatly refuſed to help him: while the Clodian faction treated

his character and conſulſhip with the utmoſt deriſion, and Clodius himſelf at the head of his mob contrived to meet and inſult him at every turn; reproaching him for his cowardice and dejection, and throwing dirt and ſtones at him. This being the ſtate of affairs with him, he called a council of his friends, with intent to take his final reſolution, agreeably to their advice. The queſtion was, whether it was beſt to ſtay, and defend himſelf by force, or to ſave the effuſion of blood by retreating, till the ſtorm ſhould blow over. Some adviſed the firſt; but Cato, and above all Hortenſius, warmly urged the laſt: which, concurring alſo with Atticus's advice, as well as the fears and entreaties of all his own family, made him reſolve to quit the field to his enemies, and ſubmit to a voluntary exile.

As ſoon as it was known that Cicero was gone, Clodius filled the forum with his band of ſlaves and incendiaries, which he called the Roman people, though there was not one honeſt citizen, or man of credit amongſt them; and publiſhed a law in form againſt him for putting citizens to death unheard and uncondemned, and confirming his baniſhment in the uſual terms employed on ſuch occaſions. This law paſſed without oppoſition: and Clodius loſt no time in putting it in execution; but fell to work immediately in plundering, burning, and demoliſhing Cicero's houſes both in the city and the country. It cannot be denied, that in this calamity of his exile, he did not behave himſelf with that firmneſs, which might reaſonably be expected from one, who had born ſo glorious a part in the republick; conſcious of his

integrity, and ſuffering in the cauſe of his country: for his letters are generally filled with ſuch lamentable expreſſions of grief and deſpair, that his beſt friends, and even his wife, were forced to admoniſh him ſometimes, to rouſe his courage, and remember his former character. Atticus was conſtantly putting him in mind of it; and ſent him word of a report, that was brought to Rome by one of Craſſus's freed men, that his affliction had diſordered his ſenſes. He was now indeed attacked in the weakeſt part; the only place in which he was vulnerable. To have been as great in affliction, as he was in proſperity, would have been a perfection, not given to man: yet this very weakneſs flowed from a fource which rendered him the more amiable in all the other parts of life; and the ſame tenderneſs of diſpoſition, which made him

love his friends, his children, his country, more paſſionately than other men, made him feel the loſs of them more ſenſibly. When he had been gone a little more than two months, a motion was made in the ſenate, by one of the tribunes, who was his friend, to recall him, and repeal the law of Clodius, to which the whole houſe readily agreed. Many obſtructions, as may eaſily be imagined, were given to it by the Clodian faction; but this made the ſenate only the more reſolute to effect it. They paſſed a vote therefore that no other buſineſs ſhould be done, till Cicero's return was carried; which at laſt it was, and in ſo ſplendid and triumphant a manner, that he had reaſon, he ſays, to fear, leſt people ſhould imagine that he himſelf had contrived his late flight, for the ſake of ſo glorious a reſtoration.

CICERO, now in his fiftieth year, was reſtored to his former dignity, and ſoon after to his former fortunes; ſatisfaction being made to him for the ruin of his eſtates and houſes, which laſt were built up again by himſelf with more magnificence than before. But he had domeſtic grievances about this time, which touched him nearly; and which, as he ſignifies obſcurely to Atticus, were of too delicate a nature to be explained by a letter. They aroſe chiefly from the petulant humour of his wife, which began to give him frequent occaſions of chagrin; and by a ſeries of repeated provocations confirmed in him that ſettled diſguſt, which ended at laſt in a divorce. As to his publick concerns, his chief point was how to ſupport his former authority in the city, which it was not eaſy to do, when the government of the repub-

lick was uſurped by the power and ambition of a few: and therefore, inſtead of the able ſtateſman and generous patriot, a light in which we have hitherto viewed him, we find him acting a ſubſervient part, and managing the triumvirate, which could not be controuled, in the beſt manner he could for the publick welfare. In the fifty-ſixth year of his age he was ſent into Aſia, and obliged to aſſume a new character, which he had never before ſuſtained, of the governor of a province and general of an army. Theſe preferments were, of all others, the moſt ardently deſired by the great, for the advantages they afforded both of acquiring power, and amaſſing wealth: yet they had no charms for Cicero, but were indeed diſagreeable to his temper, which was not formed for military atchievements, but to ſit at the

helm, and ſhine in the adminiſtration of the whole republick. However, he acquitted himſelf nobly in adminiſtering the civil affairs of his province of Cilicia; where his whole care was, to eaſe the ſeveral cities and diſtricts, of that exceſſive load of debts, in which the avarice and rapaciouſneſs of former governors had involved them. Nor does he ſeem, in military affairs, to have wanted either the courage or conduct of an experienced leader. For he played the general ſo well in the few expeditions in which he was concerned, that he had the honour of a ſupplication decreed to him at Rome, and was not without ſome expectation even of a triumph.

In his ſixty-firſt year, he was obliged to part with his wife Terentia; whoſe humour and conduct had long

been uneaſy to him. This drew upon him ſome cenſure; for putting away a wife, who had lived with him above thirty years, the faithful partner of his bed and fortunes; and the mother of two children, extremely dear to him: and what gave his enemies the greater handle to rally him was, his marrying a handſome young woman, named Publilia, of an age diſproportioned to his own, and to whom he was guardian. But Terentia was a woman of an imperious and turbulent ſpirit: and though he had borne her perverſeneſs in the vigour of health and flouriſhing ſtate of his fortunes; yet, in a declining life, ſoured by a continual ſucceſſion of mortifications from abroad, the want of eaſe and quiet at home was no longer tolerable to him.

About this time a breach happened

between Cæsar and Pompey, the natural consequence of which was a war, in which the former was victorious: but Cicero, in concert with several others, murdered him.

Not long after Cicero was oppressed by a new and most cruel affliction, the death of his beloved daughter Tullia; who died in childbed, soon after her divorce from her third husband Dolabella. She was about two and thirty years old at the time of her death; and by the few hints, which are left of her character, appears to have been an excellent and admirable woman. She was most affectionately and piously observant of her father; and to the usual graces of her sex, having added the more solid accomplishments of knowledge and polite letters, was qualified to be the companion as well as the de-

light of his age; and was juſtly eſteemed not only as one of the beſt, but the moſt learned of the Roman ladies. His affliction for the death of this daughter was ſo great, that the philoſophers are ſaid to have come from all parts to comfort him. But this can hardly be true, except of thoſe who lived in Rome, or in his own family: for his firſt care was, to ſhun all company as much as he could, by removing to Atticus's houſe, where he lived chiefly in his library, turning over every book he could meet with, on the ſubject of moderating grief. But finding his reſidence here too publick, and a greater reſort to him, than he could bear, he retired to Aſturia, one of his ſeats near Antium; a little iſland on the Latian ſhore, at the mouth of a river of the ſame name, covered with woods and groves, cut out into ſhady walks; a ſcene of all others the fitteſt to in-

dulge melancholy, and where he could give a free courſe to his grief. "Here, "ſays he to Atticus, I live without "the ſpeech of man, every morning "early I hide myſelf in the thickeſt of "the wood, and never come out till "the evening. Next to yourſelf, no-"thing is ſo dear to me as this ſoli-"tude; and my whole converſation "is with my books." Indeed his whole time was employed in little elſe than reading and writing, during Cæſar's adminiſtration, which he never could chearfully ſubmit to; and it was within this period, that he drew up ſome of the graveſt of thoſe philoſophical pieces, which are ſtill extant in his works.

In the hurry of all his politicks, he was proſecuting his ſtudies ſtill with his uſual application; and beſides

ſome philoſophical pieces, now finiſhed his book of offices, or the duties of man, for the uſe of his ſon. A work admired by all ſucceeding ages, as the moſt perfect ſyſtem of heathen morality, and the nobleſt effort and ſpecimen of what reaſon could do towards guiding man through life with innocence and happineſs.

He joined with Antony and Lepidus, to be of the triumvirate; but Antony, againſt whom he wrote his Philippicks, was the occaſion of his being proſcribed. Cicero was at his Tuſculan villa, when he firſt received the news of the proſcription, and of his being included in it. It was the deſign of the triumvirate to keep it a ſecret, if poſſible, to the moment of execution; in order to ſurpriſe thoſe whom they had deſtined to deſtruc-

tion, before they were aware of the danger, or had time to eſcape. But ſome of Cicero's friends found means to give him early notice of it, upon which he ſet forward preſently towards Aſturia, the neareſt village, which he had upon the ſea; where he embarked in a veſſel ready for him, with intent to tranſport himſelf directly out of the reach of his enemies. But the winds being croſs and turbulent, and the ſea wholly uneaſy to him, after he had ſailed about two leagues along the coaſt, he landed at Circæum, and ſpent a night near that place in great anxiety and irreſolution. The queſtion was, what courſe he ſhould ſteer; and whether he ſhould fly to Brutus, or Caſſius, or to S. Pompeius: but after all his deliberations, none of them, it is ſaid, pleaſed him ſo much, as the expedient of dying. So that, as Plutarch ſays, he

had ſome thoughts of returning to the city, and killing himſelf in Cæſar's houſe; in order to leave the guilt and curſe of his blood upon Cæſar's perfidy and ingratitude: but the importunity of his ſervants prevailed with him to ſail forward to Cajeta; where he went again on ſhore, to repoſe himſelf in the Formian villa, about a mile from the coaſt: weary of his life and the ſea; and declaring he would die in that country, which he had ſo often ſaved. Here he ſlept ſoundly for ſeveral hours; though, as ſome writers tells us, a great number of crows were fluttering all the while, and making a ſtrange noiſe about his windows, as if to rouſe and warn him of his approaching fate; and that one of them made its way into the chamber, and pulled away his very bed-cloaths; till his ſlaves, admoniſhed by this prodigy, and aſhamed to ſee

brute creatures more ſolicitous for his ſafety than themſelves, forced him into his litter or portable chair, and carried him away towards the ſhip, through the private ways and walks of his woods; having juſt heard, that ſoldiers were already come into the country in queſt of him, and not far from the villa. As ſoon as they were gone, the ſoldiers arrived at the houſe; and perceiving him to be fled, purſued immediately towards the ſea, and overtook him in the wood. Their leader was one Popilius Lenas, a tribune or colonel of the army, whom Cicero had formerly defended and preſerved in a capital cauſe. As ſoon as the ſoldiers appeared, the ſervants prepared themſelves to fight, being reſolved to defend their maſter's life at the hazard of their own; but Cicero commanded them to ſet him down, and to make no reſiſ-

tance. Then looking upon his executioners with great preſence and firmneſs, and thruſting his neck, as forwardly as he could, out of the litter, he bad them do their work, and take what they wanted. Upon which they cut off his head, and both his hands, and returned with them in all haſte and great joy towards Rome, as the moſt agreeable preſent, which they could carry to Antony. Popilius charged himſelf with the conveyance, without reflecting on the infamy of carrying that head, which had ſaved his own. He found Antony in the forum, ſurrounded with guards and crouds of people; but upon ſhewing, from a diſtance, the ſpoils which he brought, he was rewarded upon the ſpot with the honour of a crown, and about eight thouſand pounds ſterling. Antony ordered the head to be fixed

upon the roſtra between the two hands: a ſad ſpectacle to the city; and what drew tears from every eye; to ſee thoſe mangled members, which uſed to exert themſelves ſo glorioufly from that place, in defence of the lives, the fortunes, and the liberties of the Roman people, ſo lamentably expoſed to the ſcorn of ſycophants and traitors.

THIS celebrated man's murder was committed in the ſixty-fourth year of his age.

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THOUGHTS OF CICERO.

I.

On RELIGION.

WHO can doubt the certainty of there being an almighty and omniſcient God, who governs all things, when we behold the vaſt expanſe of heaven, and contemplate the ſun, moon, and all the other celeſtial bodies? He

who is in the leaſt dubious of this, may as well ſay there is no ſun; for we have as evident proofs of the exiſtence of the one, as of the other. If the veracity of this opinion had not been thoroughly believed, it would have been many centuries ago quite exploded, as all other vain and fictitious notions preſently are; but this daily gains a firmer footing. Does any body now imagine that there ever were ſuch beings as the hippocentaur, or chimera? Or is the exiſtence of ſuch infernal monſters, as Cerberus, the Parcæ or Fates, &c. now credited, even by the moſt ſtupid old wife? Every opinion which is agreeable to nature is confirmed and eſtabliſhed by time; whereas all feigned hypotheſes are effaced by it. Thus we ſee, that the divine rites of religion, and the veneration paid to the Supreme Being, daily gains ground, and is improved as well among other nations as in ~~own~~ our own.

The following ſuppoſition of Ariſtotle is excellent. If there were men, ſays he, who had always dwelt in ſubterranean apartments,

adorned with the utmoſt ſplendour and magnificence, and ornamented with ſtatues and pictures, being alſo well furniſhed with every thing that thoſe who are eſteemed wealthy and happy poſſeſs; and that without ever beholding the ſurface of our globe, theſe had, by fame or inſtruction, been told that there was an eternal and almighty God: then, that after ſome time, an opening ſhould be made in the earth, to let them forſake their dwelling underground, and aſcend to the world inhabited by us. When they beheld the earth, the ſea, and the heavens; when they viewed the extenſive circuit of the ſkies, and felt the power of the winds; when they obſerved the ſun, and took notice of its prodigious ſize and ſplendour, and had been acquainted with its ſurpriſing influence; and how, by ſhining through the heavens, it cauſes day. When, on night's ſpreading her ſable mantle over the earth, their eyes were ſtruck with the luſtre of the ſtars, with which the firmament is beſpangled; when they were informed of the regular changing of the moon, both in its increaſe and wane;

and alſo of the riſing and ſetting of all theſe celeſtial bodies, and their ſtated and unchangeable revolutions from the beginning of the world. Undoubtedly on ſuch a proſpect, they would imagine that there was an omnipotent God, and that theſe ſurpriſing things were the work of his hands.

SUCH is Ariſtotle's ſuppoſition. Let us now make another, and imagine ſuch a darkneſs as an eruption of mount Ætna once cauſed; when the neighbouring countries were ſo benighted for two days, that one man could not ſee another; ſo that on the third day, when the ſun ſhone forth with all its uſual ſplendour, they ſeemed riſen, as it were, from the dead. Should it happen, that, after being enveloped in eternal darkneſs, the light ſuddenly ruſhed upon our ſight, how much would we be ſurpriſed when we beheld the heavens? The ſame objects conſtantly returning to our view, renders them familiar to us; and mankind are not very apt to admire or enquire into the cauſes of what they ſee every day; as if we were prompted ſtrictly

to examine the cauſes of things rather from their novelty, than from their greatneſs and excellence.

OUGHT he to be eſteemed a rational being, who, after having beheld the ſtated and invariable motions of the heavens, the regular arrangements and diſpoſition of the ſtars, and the nice connexion and harmony which reign throughout every part of the creation, ſhall, in ſpight of all this, argue, that all this is the effect of blind chance, and not the work of reaſon; though the wiſdom, by which they are conducted, is incomprehenſible to our weak underſtandings? We heſitate not in the leaſt to allow, when we behold a ſphere, a curious dial, or any other piece of ingenious machinery moving artificially, that they were the effects of deſign: and can we then doubt that the world is directed, I ſhall not ſay ſimply by intelligence, but by the moſt conſummate and divine wiſdom, when we contemplate that mighty power, whereby the heavens perform their revolutions with ſuch ſurpriſing velocity, which occaſions the regular

change of the ſeaſons, ſo admirably contrived for promoting the happineſs and preſervation of the whole ſyſtem? How abſurd then are all the ſubtilties of ſophiſtry; ſince here we have evident proofs of the excellence of thoſe things which we aſcribe to Divine Providence?

When we view the beauty and ſplendour of the heavens, and conſider the prodigious ſwiftneſs of their revolution, the viciſſitudes of day and night, the ſucceſſive change of the ſeaſons, ſo neceſſary for ripening the fruits of the earth, and preſerving a juſt temperature in all bodies; the ſun, by which all theſe phænomena are regulated; then the moon, whoſe augmentation and diminution of light ſeems ſo well adapted to mark our calendar; the five planets likewiſe revolving through the twelve ſigns of the zodiac, and all of them performing their various courſes with the utmoſt regularity, though with different motions; alſo the nightly proſpect of the firmament, adorned with ſo immenſe a number of ſtars; then the terreſtrial

globe, raiſed above the ſea, and fixed in the center of the univerſe; which in two regions, ſeparate from each other, is habitable and cultivated. We live in one of theſe, whoſe ſituation is towards the north pole, from whence

The gelid ſnows are by the north wind brought.

The other, which the Greeks call Ἀντίχθων; lies towards the ſouth. Whilſt the other parts are quite uninhabited, on account of the exceſſive heats and colds which prevail there. But here, in our bleſt ſituation, at the proper time,

The ſun ſhines forth, the trees
Their leaves ſhoot out, the vines
Beneath their juicy load bend down,
The fertile ſoil a plenteous harveſt yields,
All nature blooms. Up ſpring refreſhing ſtreams,
And th' enamel'd fields the gayeſt herbage wear.

WHEN we alſo conſider the vaſt number of cattle, ſome of which we make uſe of for our nouriſhment, and others to ſupply us with cloathing; one part for the convenience of carriage, another, to aſſiſt us in agriculture: again, when we reflect on man himſelf, formed to contemplate the heavens, and adore the celeſtial beings; and, in a word, when we behold all this terreſtrial globe, as well ſea as land, ſubſervient to his accomodation.

CAN any one in the leaſt doubt, after conſidering all theſe, and the other innumerable objects of the univerſe; that, if they were created, according to Plato, ſome efficient cauſe preſides over them, or if, as Ariſtotle ſays, they have been from eternity, that they are ſuperintended and directed by an omnipotent being?

WHO could have thought that ever there would have been a man who ſhould imagine, that the beautiful and perfect ſyſtem of the univerſe could be formed by the accidental

concourſe of certain ſolid and indiviſible bodies, neceſſarily moved by the force of their natural gravity? He who can bring himſelf to think thus, may as readily believe, that if a large number of types, made of gold or any other metal, repreſenting the letters of the alphabet, be thrown on the ground, they would form the annals of Ennius, ſo as to render them legible: whereas I dare even venture to ſay, that it is beyond the power of chance to produce one ſingle verſe? How then can theſe perſons aſſert, that corpuſcles without colour, without any of that quality which is named ποιοτης, by the Greeks, and without intelligence, ſhould, by only floating about at random, accidentally concur to the formation of the world, nay, of a prodigious number of worlds, perpetually to ſupply the place of periſhing ones. But if a world is made by this concourſe of atoms, why does it not alſo form a portico, a temple, a houſe, or a city; which can undoubtedly be effected with far more facility.

ANOTHER evident proof of the exiſtence

of celeſtial beings is, that there is no nation ſo barbarous, no perſon ſo ſavage, whoſe mind is not imbued with this perſuaſion. Several people, it muſt be owned, think very unworthily concerning the gods; but this is occaſioned by the prejudices of their education, and their bad morals: however, all agree in acknowledging a divine and ſupreme nature. Neither is this perſuaſion the reſult of any conference, or concert of mankind; nor does it derive its authority from the power of cuſtom, or the ſanction of the laws. Now, in all caſes, the common conſent of mankind is to be eſteemed a law of nature.

If I was deſired by any one to define what God is, I ſhould follow the example of Simonides, who, when the ſame taſk was impoſed on him by the tyrant Hiero, deſired one day to conſider of it; the following day, the ſame queſtion being again put to him, he begged two days more; then four, and ſo on for a long time, always doubling his demand. The King being greatly ſurpriſed at this,

aſked the reaſon of it, to which he replied, "That it appeared the more incomprehen-"ſible to him, the longer he meditated up-"on it." For I imagine that Simonides (who was a man of prodigious knowledge and wiſdom, as well as an excellent poet) was bewildered in numberleſs opinions, each more ſubtile and abſtracted than the other: and being uncertain which of them had the greateſt appearance of truth, he laid aſide all hopes of finding it.

WE can therefore think no otherwiſe of God, ſo far as his nature is comprehenſible by us, than that he is of a pure and free intelligence, or ſpirit, quite diſtinct from all corruptible matter, who ſees and moves all things, and has been poſſeſſed of ſelf-motion from eternity.

WHEN we conſider the powers of the human mind, we ought reaſonably to infer, that there muſt exiſt a divine mind, far ſuperior to the activity of ours. For as Socrates aſks in Xenophon, "Whence hath man

derived his ſpiritual nature?" As to the conſtituent parts of the body, the humours, the heat diffuſed through it, the ſolids and the breath we reſpire, they are eaſily traced from their reſpective elements; one proceeding from water, another from fire, a third from earth, and a fourth from air. But how came we by our reaſon, that is, our underſtanding, judgment, thought, prudence? Whence does it come?

THE beauty of the univerſe, and the harmony of the celeſtial bodies, alſo oblige us to own, that there exiſts a Being altogether perfect, excellent and eternal; who is worthy of the greateſt reſpect and admiration from mankind. Wherefore, as religion which is intimately connected with the knowledge of nature, ought to be propagated, ſo ſuperſtition ſhould be entirely rooted out. Whatever way you turn the follies of ſuperſtition, you are ſure to ſtrike your obſervation; whether you liſten to a diviner, or attend to an omen; whether you ſacrifice, or obſerve the flight of a bird; whether you

meet a Gypſy, or ſoothſayer: nay, does it but thunder, or lighten or ſhould any monſtrous production or extraordinary accidents occur, is ſtruck with horror. As theſe incidents muſt often happen in the courſe of things, the ſuperſtitious perſon is thereby alarmed, and never an hour paſſes without giving him uneaſineſs.

We are by duty bound to worſhip the gods; and this is beſt performed, moſt pure and perfect, and moſt worthy of the appellation of piety, when it is offered with a ſincere heart: for the diſtinction between religion and ſuperſtition has been carefully obſerved, not only by the philoſophers, but alſo by our anceſtors.

Every one ought therefore to remember, that all things are governed by the gods, who are ſupreme over all; that they direct all events by their wiſdom and influence, and that they act kindly, and with the utmoſt benevolence, towards mankind; alſo that they know every perſon's real character, take notice of

his actions, whether good or bad, obſerve whether we are ſincere in our profeſſions of religion, and that they will undoubtedly make a great difference between virtuous and wicked men.

CAN any one diſpute the utility of theſe ſentiments, when he reflects how many important affairs are decided by oaths; how much the ſacred rites performed in making treaties, tend to aſſure peace and tranquillity; alſo what multitudes has the fear of divine puniſhment reclaimed from a vicious courſe of life; and how ſacred the ſocial rights muſt be, in a ſociety, where a firm perſuaſion obtains of the immediate intervention of the immortal gods, who are both judges and and witneſſes of their actions?

PIETY, like all other virtues, cannot conſiſt in diſſimulation; neither ſanctity of manners, nor religion, can be in the leaſt ſupported without piety; and how dreadful would be the conſequences, if theſe were de-

ſtroyed? Nay, I even doubt, whether that beſt of all virtues, juſtice, and the mutual confidence and ſociety of mankind could ſubſiſt, were we not to obſerve all due piety and reſpect towards the gods.

II.

On MAN.

THE Supreme Being, by a ſingular act of his loving-kindneſs, has given MAN a very diſtinguiſhed rank in the creation; he may be defined to be an animal endowed with forecaſt, wiſdom, wit, penetration, memory, judgment, and prudence: he being the only part of the animal creation who enjoys reaſon and thought.

NOTHING is of greater importance to the human ſoul, than to comprehend its own nature: and undoubtedly Apollo had this in view, when he enjoined every one in his precept to know himſelf: for I cannot think that it directs us to ſtudy the various parts of our bodies, or their ſize and ſhape. Body

conſtitutes not our being; nor do I addreſs myſelf to your body, when I talk with you. Wherefore, when the oracle ſays, "Know thyſelf," it certainly means, Know thy ſoul. The body is no more than the veſſel or receptacle of the ſoul, and the actions of the latter only can properly be called the actions of the man. In a word, this would not have paſſed for a ſaying of ſuch acuteneſs, as to have been attributed to a god, if the knowledge of the ſoul was not an admirable accompliſhment.

"KNOW thyſelf," was a precept intended not only to obviate men's pride, but alſo that we might have a juſt notion of our own real worth.

THAT man muſt be ſenſible that he is poſſeſſed of a divine principle, who knows himſelf; he will regard his rational part as the reſemblance of ſome divinity conſecrated within him; and will ever be upon his guard, that his ſentiments, as well as his external behaviour, may be worthy of this va-

luable divine preſent. When he ſeriouſly and thoroughly examines all his powers, he will be ſenſible of the ſingular advantages nature has beſtowed upon him, and of the great helps he is furniſhed with for the acquiſition of wiſdom: for as ſoon as he is born, he has faint ideas of all things delineated, as it were, in his mind, by the enlightening aſſiſtance of which, and the guidance of wiſdom, he may become both a good and happy man.

WHAT can be happier than that man who, having attained a thorough knowledge of virtue, throws off all indulgence to body and ſenſe, regards pleaſure as a thing unworthy the dignity of his nature, dreads not the approach of diſtreſs, or even of death itſelf; who maintains a benevolent intercourſe with his friends, and in that number includes all mankind in general, as being united together by one common nature; in fine, who behaves with the utmoſt reverence and piety towards the gods, and exerts the utmoſt force of his rational powers to diſtinguiſh good from evil,

in the ſame manner as we ſtrain our eyes, in order the more attentively to view an object.

When he ſhall have contemplated the heavens, the earth, and the ſeas; conſidered the nature of all things, and informed himſelf whence they were generated, to what ſtate they return, the time and manner of their diſſolution, and what parts of them are mortal and periſhing, and what divine and everlaſting; when he ſhall have attained, in a great meaſure, the knowledge of the almighty and omniſcient Governor of them, and ſhall regard himſelf as a citizen of the whole world, conſidered as one ſtate, and not as the member of any particular community, or as confined within the walls of any one city: on ſo glorious a repreſentation of things as this, and on ſuch a knowledge and view of nature, how juſt a notion would he have of Apollo's precept, by knowing himſelf! What a mean opinion would he have of thoſe things which are ſo highly eſteemed by vulgar minds!

He would ſecure and guard all theſe acquirements, as with a fence, by the ſcience of diſtinguiſhing truth from falſhood, and the art of reaſoning, that teaches him to know what conſequences follow from premiſſes, and how far one propoſition claſhes with another. When ſuch a perſon was convinced that nature deſigned him for ſociety, theſe diſquiſitions alone would not ſatisfy him, but he would put in practice that comprehenſive eloquence which is neceſſary for governing kingdoms, making laws, puniſhing criminals, defending the virtuous, and publiſhing the praiſes of great men: he would alſo make uſe of his perſuaſive eloquence to recommend ſalutary maxims to his own countrymen, to raiſe in them a glorious emulation for virtue, and ſhew them the deformity of vice; to comfort the diſtreſſed, and, in a word, by his writings to immortalize the wiſe regulations and noble deeds of the prudent and brave, and to publiſh the ſhame and infamy of the wicked.

They who deſire to know themſelves

will find all these valuable things in man: however, wisdom is the parent and director of them all.

We cannot find the origin of human souls in any terrestrial matter: they do not consist of a mixture or composition of parts, nor any thing that participates of earth, or consists of water, air, or fire. These substances contain not any quality that in the smallest degree resembles the powers of memory, wisdom, and reflexion, or that can recollect the past, provide against the future, or comprehend what is present: these are all emanations from the Divinity, nor can any other being than God himself bestow them upon man. It is therefore natural to conclude, that the nature and powers of the human soul are of a singular kind, and perfectly distinct from these well-known substances. It follows of course, that a being endowed with perception, understanding, free-will, and a principle of life, is undoubtedly of heavenly and divine origin, and consequently immortal.

THE formation of our blood, choler, phlegm, bones, nerves, and veins, may be eaſily accounted for; and alſo from whence, and after what manner all the conſtituent parts of the whole body were produced. Did the ſoul conſiſt ſolely of a bare vital principle, we might imagine that human life was ſuſtained in the ſame manner as vegetables; for theſe are likewiſe ſaid to live. Beſides, was the ſoul of man poſſeſſed of no other faculties than a mere inſtinct of appetite and averſion, this would be common to it with the brute creation.

MEMORY is one of the moſt diſtinguiſhing powers of the human ſoul, and is almoſt infinite, being capable of containing numberleſs incidents; inſomuch, that Plato imagines it to be the recollection of what paſſed in a former life: for in his treatiſe called Menon he introduces Socrates queſtioning a child with regard to the geometrical dimenſions of a ſquare. The child makes ſuch anſwers as may be expected from one of his age; and yet the queſtions are put in ſo eaſy

a way, that he goes on anſwering one thing after another, till he comes to the ſame concluſion as if he had been taught geometry: whence Socrates draws this inference, that to learn is no more than to recollect. This is explained in a more accurate manner in the diſcourſe he held the very day on which he was put to death: for he there aſſerts, that a perfect ruſtic, by anſwering the queſtions put to him, plainly ſhews that he did not learn thoſe things at that time, but only recollected them. It is alſo impoſſible that the ideas of ſo many and ſo vaſt objects ſhould in our childhood be implanted and ſtamped, as it were, on our minds, and for this reaſon named innate, had not the ſoul been poſſeſſed of the knowledge of things before it entered into the body. Moreover, if, as Plato conſtantly maintains, nothing has a real exiſtence that has a commencement of being, or that comes to a diſſolution, becauſe true exiſtence is peculiar to that which never changes, and ſuch are our ideas; in this caſe the ſoul having no real exiſtence after its union with the body, could not have acquired ſuch

univerſal knowledge, and therefore muſt have brought this ineſtimable acquiſition along with it. Whence the wonder ceaſes, how it happens to be acquainted with ſo vaſt a number of things. The ſoul indeed does not perceive all its ideas upon its firſt entrance into ſuch a diſordered abode; it requires ſome time to recollect and recover itſelf, and then it regains them by reminiſcence. Learning therefore is in fact no more than recollection.

I IMAGINE we may inveſtigate the nature and origin of this power. It is neither the effect of the heart, the blood, the brain, nor of a concourſe of atoms. Whether the ſoul conſiſts of air or fire, I really cannot ſay, nor am I aſhamed, as ſeveral people are, to own myſelf ignorant, when I am ſo. And indeed, if it were allowable to affirm any thing, where poſitive evidence is wanting, I could ſwear, that the ſoul, whether compoſed of fire or air, is ſomething divine. For I would aſk, is it poſſible to imagine how ſo vaſt a memory could grow, or be in any man-

ner produced, either out of the earth, or in this groſs and cloudy atmoſphere? But tho' its eſſence be above our reach, yet we can diſcover its qualities; or if this be denied, its capacity is certainly conſpicuous. What? Are we to imagine that the human mind reſembles a common veſſel of capacity, into which the different notices, which we conſign to our memory, are poured, as it were, to be preſerved? Nothing would be more abſurd than this: for what figure can we conceive the ſoul to be; or how capacious muſt it be? Shall we then imagine the ſoul to be like wax, and that memory is only the traces or ſignatures of things upon it? But what traces do words, or even things themſelves, leave behind them? And what a prodigious volume muſt it be, which can contain the impreſſions of ſo immenſe a number of objects?

WHAT then is that other power, or faculty, which inveſtigates the ſecrets of nature, and is called thought or invention? Do you think it is the effect of the happieſt

temperament of an earthly, frail, and periſhing matter? Can this be the origin of his mind who firſt called every thing by their proper names; which Pythagoras eſteems a work of the greateſt wiſdom? or of his, who collected the ſcattered individuals of mankind, and united them in ſociety? Can we ſay this of him, who taught how to expreſs, by the characters of a few letters, the almoſt infinitely different ſounds of the voice? or of that man who marked out the courſes, progreſſions, and order of the planets? Theſe were all men of extraordinary genius: but ſtill greater, and far more beneficial to mankind, were thoſe who diſcovered the arts of agriculture, architecture, and making cloth; who refined human life, and invented new ways to defend themſelves againſt the beaſts of the foreſt: by ſuch men as theſe, being civilized and poliſhed, mankind neglected the mere neceſſary arts of life, and encouraged thoſe of taſte and elegance. Harmony, or the duly tempered variety and pitch of ſounds, was invented to delight the ear. Then followed aſtronomy, or the ſtudy of

the ſtars, as well thoſe called fixed, on account of their being always ſeen in the ſame place, as the planets or wandering ſtars, which are only ſuch in name, and not in fact. The man, therefore, who could fully comprehend their revolutions and different motions, plainly demonſtrated, that his mind reſembled that of the Almighty Creator of theſe celeſtial bodies.

The ſenſes, which are the interpreters and meſſengers of things, are alſo admirably contrived for every neceſſary occaſion of life, and placed in the head, as in a caſtle. Thus the eyes are poſted as centinels above all the reſt; that by ſeeing a prodigious number of objects, they may anſwer the purpoſe they were deſigned for. Then the ears, as being intended to perceive ſound, which naturally aſcends, were placed erect in the upper parts of the body. The noſtrils are likewiſe ſituated in the ſame manner, becauſe all ſcent aſcends; but are wiſely placed near the mouth, as it is by their means that we judge of the good or bad qualities of every thing we eat

or drink. Our taſte alſo, which is deſigned to give us a reliſh of the various ſorts of food, is placed in that part of the mouth where nature has opened a way for the paſſage of our meat and drink. But then the ſenſe of feeling is equally diffuſed over the whole body, that neither blows, nor the too near approach of heat or cold, might eſcape our notice. And, as in building, a ſkilful architect removes from under the maſter's noſe, and conceals out of his ſight, all the ſinks of the houſe deſigned for the carrying off every thing that is apt to give diſguſt; ſo nature has removed at a diſtance from our ſenſes the like parts in the human frame.

THE ſenſes are ſo ingeniouſly and curiouſly formed, that no artificer but nature, whoſe penetration and ſkill nothing can exceed, alone could execute the arduous taſk. In the firſt place, ſhe has inveſted the eyes with a covering of very delicate and thin membranes; and theſe ſhe has formed tranſparent, that objects might be ſeen through them, and likewiſe firm, to keep the eyes in

their proper ſituation. But then ſhe has made the eyes themſelves ſlippery and moveable, that they might turn away from every diſagreeable object, and direct their view wherever they pleaſed, with the utmoſt facility. The point of the eye, called the pupil, is alſo ſo very minute, that it may with great eaſe eſcape whatever might hurt it. Then the eye-lids, which cover the eyes, are of an amazing ſoftneſs, leſt they ſhould ſpoil the ſight; and curiouſly formed for opening and ſhutting the eyes, to prevent any thing from falling into them: now nature has taken care that this might be done with amazing quickneſs every moment. Moreover, they are fortified, as it were, with a paliſade of hair; that the eyes, when open, might thereby be ſecured from any thing falling into them; and in time of ſleep, when they are not uſed, they might lie wrapt up, as it were, in bedcloaths. They are alſo conveniently ſituated in a covert, and are guarded on all ſides with prominent parts. For above them are placed the eye brows; which being covered with hair, ſerve to defend them from the

ſweat running from the forehead: and they are guarded from beneath by the cheeks, which riſe into gentle hillocks. And laſtly, between the two is placed the noſe, as it were a wall of ſeparation.

THE organ of hearing, which is a ſenſe neceſſary to us even in ſleep, is conſtantly open; for we are often awaked when it is impreſſed with the ſenſation of ſound. That things may not fall into it, its paſſage is winding; for if it was otherways, accidents would frequently happen. Nature has likewiſe provided a viſcous matter, that if any inſect ſhould attempt to get into the ear, they might be caught and entangled in it, as it were with bird-lime. The outer part of the ear, called the auricle, is prominent; it being formed for covering and guarding the immediate organ, and that ſounds might not diſſipate and be loſt before they reach it. Its entrance conſiſts of hard, and, as it were, horny ſubſtances, with a vaſt number of ſinuoſities and windings; which greatly increaſes the impreſſed ſound. For this reaſon

we make uſe of ſhell or horn to play upon ſtringed-inſtruments; and ſounds returned from cloſe and ſinuous places, experience tells us, are augmented in a ſurpriſing manner.

THE noſtrils, which for neceſſary purpoſes are always open, have their apertures narrow, that nothing hurtful may get through them; and are conſtantly bedewed with moiſture, for repelling duſt and ſeveral other things. The taſte is admirably well ſecured; for being placed in the mouth, it is well ſituated both for its own preſervation, and the uſe it was intended for.

ALL the ſenſes of the human race are in an eminent degree ſuperior to thoſe of the brute creation. For, firſt the eyes, in thoſe arts of which they are properly the judges, as painting, ſculpture, and the motion and geſture of bodies, behold many things with greater penetration. The human eyes alſo judge of the beauty, the order, and the proportion of colours and figures. But what

is of ſtill greater importance than all this, they diſcern the virtues and imperfections of others; and can diſtinguiſh the paſſionate from the mild and good-natured perſon; the merry from the ſad; the courageous man from the coward, and the bold from the timorous. Nor is the nice judgment of the ear leſs admirable; for by its means we diſtinguiſh the wonderful variety of ſounds, as well vocal as inſtrumental; perceive their intervals and difference; and remark their various kinds, as high and low, the ſmooth and harſh, the grave and ſharp, the flexible and ſtiff ſound; which the human ear alone can comprehend. Our other ſenſes of ſmelling, taſting, and feeling, are alſo poſſeſſed of very acute diſcernments: for the gratification and indulgence of which, more arts have been invented than I could wiſh. It is evident to every one, that the compoſition of perfumes, the ſeaſoning of meats, and other refinements of ſenſuality, have been carried to too extravagant an height.

How commodious, how ſubſervient are

our hands to ſeveral different arts! The fingers are ſo pliant, that they move every way with the utmoſt facility, and may be cloſed and opened at pleaſure. By their aid it is that the hands are formed for painting, carving, engraving, and playing on both wind and ſtringed inſtruments. But theſe are no more than the elegant arts; thoſe of public utility in life are agriculture, architecture, the art of making cloth, of preparing ſuitable dreſſes for the body, and working in braſs and iron. From which it is evident, that as invention is the peculiar property of the mind, and perception of the ſenſes; ſo the hands of proper workmen furniſh us with all the conveniencies of life: to them we are indebted for our houſes, clothes, and means of ſafety; and alſo, for our cities, walls, and temples.

We are alſo furniſhed with plenty and variety of food by human labour, or in other words, the application of the hands. Were it not for manual culture, we ſhould have but little of the fruits of the earth, as well

thoſe that ſerve for preſent uſe, as thoſe which we pickle to keep for ſome time. We partly live on land and water animals, with fowl; but then they muſt either be caught, or bred up by us. Four-footed beaſts are broken by us, in order that they may anſwer the purpoſes of carriage; and ſupply our want of ſtrength and ſwiftneſs by their own. Some animals we yoke, and others we load with burdens. We alſo turn to our advantage the ſagacity of dogs, and the ſurpriſing tractableneſs of the elephant. Iron being neceſſary for the purpoſes of agriculture, we extract it out of the earth; and notwithſtanding the depth of the veins of gold, ſilver, and copper in the ground, we ſearch them out, both for ornament and uſe. By felling trees alſo, whether planted by our own hands, or ſuch as grow in the foreſt, we are ſupplied with fuel to warm us and dreſs our food, or timber to build houſes, and to protect and cover us from the ſeverities and changes of the weather. They are alſo vaſtly uſeful to us for building ſhips; by the navigating of which, all the neceſſaries of life are imported

from the moſt diſtant parts of the world: for we alone, by our knowledge of maritime affairs, are able to give laws to thoſe moſt violent productions of nature, the ſea and winds; and in fact, we are ſupplied with almoſt all things the ſea produces. Man has alſo at his command all the conveniencies the earth affords. We poſſeſs the hills and the valleys; the rivers and the lakes are ours; corn and trees of every ſpecies are ſown and planted by us; we add new fertility to lands, by overflowing them with water; the guiding or changing the courſes of rivers, or chaining them up, is our work: in ſhort, we in a manner change the face of things and nature, by our manual labour.

III.

On CONSCIENCE.

WHATEVER the world may ſay of me I eſteem as nothing, in compariſon of the teſtimony of my own conſcience.

NOTHING appears to me ſo praiſe-worthy as what is done without oſtentation, and without mankind's being witneſſes to it: not that we ought altogether to avoid the public eye, for laudable deeds wiſh to be placed in the light; yet conſcience is the greateſt theatre for virtue.

THAT power of the mind which incites to virtuous actions, and diſſuades from evil ones, is not only more antient than the origin of nations, but is coeval with the great Cre-

ator of the univerſe: for the divine mind cannot exiſt without reaſon; and divine reaſon muſt neceſſarily be poſſeſſed of a power to determine what is virtuous, and what vitious. Nor, becauſe it was no where written, that one man ſhould maintain the paſs of a bridge againſt the whole army of the enemy, and that he ſhould order the bridge behind him to be broken down, are we therefore to conclude, that the brave Cocles did not perform this wonderful atchievement agreeably to the nature and dictates of real bravery. Again, though there was no written law concerning adultery in Tarquin's reign, yet we ought not thence to imagine that Sextus Tarquinius did not break this eternal law, by committing a rape on Lucretia, the daughter of Tricipitinus: for even then he had the light of reaſon, deduced from the nature of things, that incites to good actions, and diſſuades from evil; and which has the force of a law, not from the time it was written, but from the very inſtant that it began to exiſt. Therefore its exiſtence muſt be equal to that of the divine mind.

RIGHT reaſon, or that which is agreeable to nature, invariable, eternal, and with which all the human race are impreſſed, is in all reſpects a true law. It commands our duty in very expreſs terms, and ſtrictly forbids all treachery: it has this good effect, however, on none but the virtuous; for it makes not the leaſt impreſſion on the vitious. Nothing can ſuperſede this law, nothing retrench it, or make it void. Neither the ſenate nor people can diſpenſe with it. No comment or interpreter is neceſſary for it. This law is the ſame at Rome as it is at Athens, and it will ever be the ſame as it is at preſent; it is an eternal and immutable law, that is univerſally binding over all nations and at all times. Thus God in a manner becomes the common inſtructor and governor of men. He alone it was who compoſed, examined, and promulgated it. Whoever therefore acts contrary to this law, oppoſes his own intereſt, and ſpurns at the true dignity of man; and by this very means will be certain of ſuffering the greateſt of all puniſhments, though he

ſhould eſcape what generally goes under that title.

THEY are not ſo much tormented with puniſhments ſuch as thoſe inflicted by courts of juſtice (which formerly were not in being, nor are, at this time, in ſeveral countries; and even where eſtabliſhed, are often biaſſed and partial), as with what they ſuffer from conſcience. They are not, as the poets feign, purſued and plagued by the furies with burning torches, but by remorſe and the pangs of a guilty mind.

THE dramatic repreſentations ought not to be credited, which would inſinuate, That the furies perpetually terrify and torment thoſe with their torches who have committed any impious or wicked action: It is the dread ariſing from guilt which torments every ſinner, diſturbs his repoſe, and even robs him of his ſenſes; he is filled with diſmay by his own conſcious heart and evil thoughts. The wicked are continually accompanied by theſe domeſtic furies.

WERE mankind reſtrained from wickedneſs by the dread of puniſhment alone, and not by the nature of the thing itſelf; what, I would aſk, could give villains the leaſt uneaſineſs, abſtracting from all fears of this kind? And yet none of them was ever ſo audaciouſly impudent, but endeavoured to juſtify what he had done by ſome law of nature, denied the fact, or elſe pretended a deep contrition or repentance for it. Now if the wicked have the confidence to appeal to theſe laws, in how reſpectful a manner ought they to be treated by the virtuous.

IF people were deterred from a vicious courſe of life either by puniſhment, or the fear of it, and not by the turpitude of the thing itſelf; then none could be guilty of injuſtice, the greateſt criminals ought rather to be deemed imprudent than wicked.

BUT they are crafty and not good men, who are determined to the practice of virtue, not by its own intrinſic excellence, but out of a view to ſome private advantage. Would

that man who is afraid of nothing but a witneſs and a judge, heſitate to commit the greateſt offence in the dark? or, ſhould he meet a ſingle man in a lonely and deſert place, with a large ſum of money about him, and altogether unable to defend himſelf from being robbed, in what manner would he behave? In ſuch a caſe, the man whom we have repreſented to be honeſt from principle, and the nature of the thing itſelf, would converſe with, aſſiſt, and ſhew him the way; but as to the man who does nothing for the ſake of another, and meaſures every thing by the advantage it brings him, it is obvious, I imagine, how ſuch a one would act. Now ſhould he deny that he would murder the man, or rob him of his treaſure, his reaſon for this cannot be, that he thinks there is any natural baſeneſs in ſuch actions; but only becauſe he is afraid of a diſcovery, and the bad conſequences that would thence enſue: a ſentiment this, at which I ſhall not ſay that men of learning, but even peaſants themſelves ought to bluſh!

EVERY one who has made any conſiderable progreſs in philoſophy muſt be perſuaded, that we ought not to be guilty of avarice, injuſtice, ſenſuality, and intemperance, even though it was poſſible to conceal it both from gods and men. To this purpoſe Plato introduces the following ſtory of Gyges, a ſhepherd belonging to the King of Lydia. A great rain having occaſioned a fiſſure of the earth, Gyges went into it, and, if we can put any confidence in fables, ſaw a brazen horſe with doors in its ſides: upon opening theſe, he beheld the corpſe of a man of a gigantic ſtature, with a gold ring on its finger: this he pulled off, and having put it upon his own, went to rejoin his fellow ſhepherds. When he turned the ſtone of this ring towards the palm of his hand, he became inviſible to others, yet ſaw every thing diſtinctly himſelf; and by turning the ring to its proper place, he became viſible again. Taking the advantage which this ring afforded him, he lay with the queen; by whoſe aſſiſtance he ſlew the king his maſter, and diſpatched all thoſe whom he imagined would oppoſe him:

nor in committing theſe murders could any one ſee him: and thus by the help of his ring, he ſoon became king of Lydia. Had this ring been in the poſſeſſion of a wiſe man, he would not have thought himſelf authoriſed by it to commit a villainous action: for the real excellence of an action, and not its concealment, is the object of the virtuous man's attention.

IV.

On the PASSIONS.

PASSION is defined by Zeno to be *a commotion of the ſoul, contrary both to right reaſon and nature.* Others ſay in fewer words, that is is *an exceſſive appetite*, or ſuch as goes beyond the bounds which nature preſcribes. Agreeable to the opinion of theſe men, there are two kinds of good, and as many of evil, whence ariſe ſo many paſſions. Joy and deſire ariſe from good; the former reſulting from a good in poſſeſſion, and the latter from that in expectation. The paſſions imagined to be produced by evil are ſorrow and fear: ſorrow regards preſent evil, and fear that which is to come; for whatever excites fear, when at a diſtance, naturally raiſes ſorrow, when preſent.

THE Stoics are of opinion, that judgment of things gives riſe to all the paſſions; and hence they give a more preciſe and determinate definition of them, in order to make it appear, not only how vaſtly blameable they are in themſelves, but alſo how much they are ſubjected to our will. Sorrow then is the opinion of a preſent evil, on account of which it ſeems juſt that the mind ſhould be in a manner contracted and depreſſed; joy, the opinion of a preſent good, for which it is reaſonable our ſpirits ſhould be elated; fear, the opinion of a future evil, which appears inſupportable; and deſire, the opinion of a future good, which ſeems to promiſe great advantage.

SINCE the paſſions therefore are owing to our ſentiments and opinion of things, ſo the effects of paſſion muſt alſo be attributed to thoſe; as, the biting anguiſh which proceeds from grief; the retreat, as it were, of the ſoul, cauſed by fear; the exceſſive vivacity of joy, and the unbounded luſt of deſire.

THE Stoics call the opinion, which we have ſuppoſed to be included in all the above definitions, a weak aſſent, or perſuaſion of the mind.

THE reaſoning of the Peripatetics muſt undoubtedly then be trifling and abſurd, who affirm that our minds are neceſſarily ſubject to paſſions, and yet preſcribe certain limits to them which they ought not to exceed. I would aſk any one who ſets bounds to vice, whether to act contrary to the dictates of reaſon, does not deſerve that name? Now does not reaſon abundantly evince, that what you fall under the weight of, or become, in a manner, ſtupified leſt it overtake you, is not a real evil; and that all exceſs, whether of joy or grief, is the real effect of prejudice or error? If then this wrong judgment of things is corrected by time, even with regard to perſons of ſmall diſcernment; ſo that notwithſtanding the object remains the ſame, yet their ſentiments concerning it are very different from what they were formerly; it

follows, that prudent men muſt be entirely free from its influence.

He who tries to ſet bounds to vice, acts like one who ſhould imagine, that a perſon who had thrown himſelf from the precipice of Leucas, could ſtop his career when he thought proper: for as that can by no means be effected, ſo neither can the mind, when ruffled with paſſion, reſtrain itſelf, or ſtop where it chuſes.

The birth of all things which are evil muſt be pernicious in their progreſs. Now grief, and every other paſſion, when carried beyond proper bounds, have certainly very miſchievous conſequences; and therefore, from their very riſe, muſt be tainted with a great part of the lurking miſchief. For as ſoon as the government of reaſon is thrown off, they ruſh forward of their own accord; weakneſs delights in indulging itſelf; and having, if I may ſo ſay, imperceptibly launched out into the main ocean, can find no place where to ſtop.

THERE is therefore no difference between the approving of moderate paſſions, and the approbation of moderate injuſtice, moderate cowardice, or moderate intemperance: for he partly admits corrupt affection, who preſcribes bounds to them: a conduct this, which, beſides its intrinſic deformity, is the more intolerable; becauſe they are continually in a precarious ſituation; vice ſomewhat reſembling heavy bodies, which, after they are put in motion, fall down the precipice with rapidity, ſo that they cannot be ſtopped.

THAT a man may be cured of love, he ſhould in the firſt place be made ſenſible how great a madneſs it is; ſince it is undoubtedly the moſt outrageous of all the paſſions of the ſoul: for ſhould we impute to it neither debaucheries, intrigues, adulteries, or inceſts, all which are very enormous crimes; beſides theſe, I ſay, the exceſſive diſorder of the mind in love, is a deformity of itſelf. Not to inſiſt then on the above exceſſes of its madneſs, what levity appears in its ordinary, and moſt innocent effects?

The quarrels, jealouſies, and brawls of love,
Its truce, its war, or peace, uncertain prove:
As juſtly ſearch for reaſon in a fool,
As try ſuch whimſies to confine to rule.

Can any one then avoid being ſhocked at the natural deformity of a temper of mind ſo fickle and inconſtant? What we wanted to demonſtrate is, that all the paſſions are voluntary, and altogether dependent upon opinion and judgment. Mankind would always be in love, and that too with the ſame object, was that paſſion natural to them; nor ſhould we find love cured by ſhame in one, reflexion in another, and ſatiety in a third.

OUGHT that man who is the ſlave of a woman to be eſteemed free, when ſhe impoſes laws on him, commands, forbids, and regulates his conduct as ſhe thinks proper; he neither daring to refuſe what ſhe requeſts, nor to diſobey her orders? If ſhe aſks any thing, it muſt be given her; does ſhe call, he muſt anſwer; when ſhut out, he muſt quietly walk

away; in ſhort, if ſhe threatens him, he muſt tremble. Be the birth and family of this man ever ſo great, he deſerves, in my opinion, to be called not ſimply a ſlave, but one of the moſt ſervile of ſlaves.

PERSONS who are ſaid to be naturally inclined to anger, compaſſion, envy, and the like, do conſtitutionally, if I may uſe the expreſſion, labour under a diſeaſe of the ſoul; but it may be cured, as appears from what is related of Socrates. A phyſiognomiſt, Zopyrus by name, who pretended that he could tell every one's natural diſpoſition by appearance, having in a large aſſembly laid ſeveral vices to his charge, was laughed at by thoſe preſent, becauſe they were ſenſible that Socrates was guilty of none of them: however, Socrates ſaved his credit, by informing them that he was naturally addicted to all theſe vices; but that, by the aid of reaſon, he had overcome them. Wherefore, as a man in very good health may appear ſickly, and be really more inclined by nature to one diſeaſe

than another; ſo the mind may be more addicted to one vice than another.

As we conſiſt of ſoul and body, for what reaſon is it, that the art of reſtoring, and preſerving the health of the latter, is ſo diligently purſued, and its uſefulneſs held in ſuch high eſteem, as to be attributed to the invention of the Gods: whereas the art of curing mental diſeaſes was neither ſo much ſought after before its diſcovery, nor ſo carefully improved, when known; and is leſs acceptable to many, and by the generality of mankind is ſuſpected and deſpiſed? Is it becauſe the mind judges of bodily pain and diſeaſes, while the body remains quite inſenſible of the mind; ſo that the mind paſſes no judgment concerning its own ſtate, till after the judging faculty is diſordered?

THERE is this difference between our ſouls and bodies, that the latter may be ſeized with diſtempers in their moſt flouriſhing ſtate, but the former cannot. We are not to blame for all the diſeaſes of the body, but

are for thoſe of the mind; for a diſregard of reaſon may occaſion every indiſpoſition and diſorder of this laſt; and therefore can only take place in the human ſpecies: becauſe brutes, however they may have ſomething analogous, are not ſubject to paſſions.

We muſt now conſider, what powerful remedies philoſophy has provided againſt the diſeaſes of our minds: for undoubtedly there are ſuch; nor has nature been ſo unkind to men, as to produce ſo many things conducive to the health of the body, and nothing at all for that of the ſoul. No, ſhe has dealt ſtill more favourably with us in this reſpect; for every thing is found within the ſoul that contributes to its health, whereas the remedies for the body muſt be prepared from without. Now the greater the excellence and dignity of human ſouls, the larger ſhare of attention they require. Hence reaſon, if properly improved, diſcovers what is beſt; but if neglected, is loſt in a labyrinth of errors.

You muſt therefore keep a conſtant guard

over yourſelf. Though I cannot ſay but the propriety of the expreſſion may be queſtioned, as if we were made up of two perſons, the one to command, the other to obey. The obſervation, however, is very juſt; for the mind is divided into two parts, the one endowed with reaſon, and the other not. When therefore we are ordered to keep a guard over ourſelves, the meaning is, that we ſhould reſtrain the blind propenſities of our nature. The ſouls of the generality of mankind contain ſome alloy, ſomething naturally mean, languid, and enervate: and were the whole of our nature conſtituted of this, of all earthly creatures man would be the moſt deſpicable. But he is alſo endowed with reaſon, the miſtreſs, the queen, of all his other powers; which, by her own natural force, ſtill makes advances in improvement, till ſhe arrives at perfect virtue. Every man ought therefore to make it his ſtudy and care, that that part of the ſoul which ought to be under her direction be wholly governed by her.

V.

On WISDOM.

WHAT is there that we would prefer to wiſdom? What is more deſirable in itſelf, ſo ſerviceable to man, or merits his purſuit better? Hence we call thoſe who are fond of acquiring it, Philoſophers; for Philoſophy, in the ſtrict meaning of the word, ſignifies the love of wiſdom. Now wiſdom, as the antient philoſophers have explained it, is the knowledge of things divine and human, and that which conſtitutes their nature. Whoever contemns this ſtudy, I cannot ſee what he can think deſerving of his eſteem: for whether agreeable amuſements, or being free from care, be the object of his deſires, what is like unto thoſe ſtudies which tend to make us good and happy? Or if he be want-

ing to learn the principles of virtue and true valour, the art of obtaining them is to be found here, or no where elſe. They who pretend that there is no art in the moſt eſſential things, while nothing however trifling and inſignificant is performed without ſome art, are guilty of a capital error, and muſt be men of little thought. Therefore to learn virtue, where ſhall we go but to the ſchool of philoſophy?

ALTHOUGH ſight is the moſt ſubtle of our ſenſes, yet, as Plato ſays, it is too dull to diſcover a view of wiſdom to us. O were ſhe but viſible, with what ardent deſires would ſhe inflame us!

NATURE, from the beginning of the world, has inſpired all ſorts of animals with an inſtinct of ſelf-preſervation, by which they not only ſhun what would be hurtful to them, but alſo provide for the neceſſaries of life, as food, a place of retreat, and ſuch like. All animals have likewiſe another inſtinct, which is the deſire of copulation for the propagation

of their ſpecies, and the care they take of their offspring. But there is this eſſential difference betwixt a man and a brute, that the latter being entirely guided by ſenſe, is attached entirely to the preſent, and is very inſenſible both of what is paſt, and what is to come. Man, on the contrary, comprehends the whole courſe of his life, and prepares every thing proper for his future ſubſiſtence: and this he is able to do, as being endued with reaſon, by which he ſees the cauſes and conſequences of things, obſerves their riſe and progreſs, compares things of a like nature, and joins the future with the preſent.

A REMARKABLE taſte, and which is peculiar to man, is the deſire of knowing the truth: which makes us, when we have leiſure, and are free from the cares of life, have a great deſire to ſee, underſtand, or learn ſomething; being perſuaded, that in order to live happily, we muſt penetrate into what is concealed, and which raiſes our admiration.

MANKIND are ſo deeply impreſſed with a

deſire for knowledge and learning, that by this very tendency of their nature, they would certainly be engaged in the purſuit of them, though there was no advantage annexed to the acquiſition. Do not we often find that even chaſtiſements will not prevent children from ſearching into things; that though you correct them, they will ſtill continue to make further enquiry; nay, how proud are they of their little attainments of knowledge; how overjoyed are they to relate them to others; and how delighted with the ſight of any ſolemnity, the public games, and things of the like nature: infomuch that on this account they will ſuffer both hunger and thirſt? Beſides, do not we ſee that thoſe who are fondeſt of the liberal arts and ſciences, for the moſt part neglect their health and domeſtic affairs; and for the ſake of acquiring their beloved knowledge, will endure the greateſt hardſhips; and think themſelves ſufficiently rewarded for their vaſt application and labour, by the intellectual pleaſures that ſpring from learning?

I imagine it was ſomething like this natural propenſity that Homer had in view, when he compoſed the fiction of the Sirens; for it appears that it was not ſo much the ſweetneſs of their voice, or the novelty and variety of their ſongs, as their pretenſions to a very great knowledge, which attracted and pleaſed thoſe who ſailed that way, who were ſo fond of learning, that it kept them, as it were, fixed to the rocks. This is the diſcourſe which they held with Ulyſſes, and it is one of the paſſages which I have tranſlated from Homer.

Thou ornament of Greece! Ulyſſes ſtay;
Why from our pleaſing ſongs thus haſte away?
None ever ſail'd along this beach before,
But with our muſic pleas'd, made for the ſhore.
When ſtor'd with learning, homeward they proceed;
And bleſs their friends with knowledge, they much need.
O ſtay! the Trojan war we fully know!
Stay! We'll inform you of all things below.

Homer knew, that if he had allowed his hero to be ſtopt only by the charms of muſic, the fiction could not have been received; but to promiſe knowledge to a man who was in love with wiſdom, it was not to be wondered at that he ſhould forget his native country.

Now we have a repreſentation from the philoſophers of what ſort of a life wiſe men would lead in the iſlands of the bleſſed: they ſuppoſe that they will be quite free from care; and having no need of any ſort of proviſion for their ſubſiſtance, will ſpend their whole time in the delightful employment of ſtudying, and making new diſcoveries.

HAD I not been fully convinced from the books and precepts of many great men, which I received and read in my youth, that nothing but honour and virtue is truly deſirable in this life; and that neither bodily torture, nor the moſt terrible dangers, even thoſe of death and baniſhment, ſhould have any weight with us, when compared with the purſuit of them; I had never bore ſo

many and ſo great conflicts in defence of your ſafety, or have expoſed myſelf to the rage of the moſt wicked of mankind. But we have examples of ſuch precepts in all the books, as well as thoſe of the antients; and antiquity lays before us many ſuch caſes, which, had not the light of learning been called to their aſſiſtance, would have been all buried in darkneſs. How many great men have the Greek and Latin writers given us portraits of, and tranſmitted down to us, not only to feaſt our eyes, but to be patterns for our imitation? I loſt not ſight of theſe admirable models, and it was from them that I got both courage and prudence, when I ſtood in need of it in the management of public affairs.

Was I to be aſked, What? Were all thoſe men whoſe virtues were famous in hiſtory, very ſkilful in the literature you commend ſo much? It will be no eaſy matter to make this appear of them all. The anſwer, however, that I would make to the above queſtion is this; that I own there have been many men of the greateſt merit and virtue, who, by

the natural force of their almoſt divine genius, and without the aid of learning, have behaved themſelves with moderation and gravity. I will even add alſo, that nature oftener ſucceeds without ſtudy, than ſtudy without the aid of nature, to raiſe mankind to the purſuit of virtue and honour. But this I maintain, that where learning is joined to a mind that is naturally endowed with great talents, there reſults from ſuch a re-union, I know not what amazing excellence, and ſingular beauty of character. That incomparable man Africanus, who lived in the time of our fathers, was of this number; alſo C. Lælius and M. Furius, the perfect models of wiſdom and probity. We may likewiſe rank with theſe M. Cato the elder, a man truly brave, and very ſkilful in every part of literature, for the times in which he lived. Now it is a thing beyond all doubt, that theſe great men would never have with ſo much eagerneſs applied themſelves to the ſtudy of letters, had they got no aid from them, as to the knowledge or practice of virtue.

ALTHOUGH learning did not produce ſuch great advantages, and if pleaſure was the only benefit that accrued from the ſtudy of them; it will nevertheleſs be allowed, I think, to be an amuſement of the moſt noble kind, and every way ſuitable to the nature of man. Other relaxations are peculiar to certain times, places, and ſtages of life; but the ſtudy of letters is the aliment of our youth, and the pleaſure of our old age; they give us joy at home, and are no incumbrance to us when abroad; in fine, they attend us in our rural retirements, are company to us at night, and our fellow travellers on a journey.

WHAT are the pleaſures of a luxurious table, ſhows, games, and ſenſuality, when put in competition with thoſe that ariſe from the ſtudy of letters? A ſtudy, that in ſenſible and well educated men ſtill increaſes in charms with their years: whence that ſaying of Solon, in a certain verſe of his, ſo worthy of praiſe, that he was daily learning as he grew older. Now no pleaſure is capable of ſurpaſſing that of the mind.

THERE are two inconveniencies that we muſt ſhun in this natural and ſo truly commendable diſpoſition of mind; one is, of thinking that we know what we do not, or building our opinion raſhly on ſuch precarious principles. Whoever would chuſe to avoid this miſtake, and certainly it is every perſon's duty, will ſpare neither time nor pains in the ſtudy of truth. Another miſtake is, when people apply too ardently to obſcure and difficult things, which are not neceſſary. Let us but ſhun theſe inconveniencies, and diligently attach ourſelves to ſuch ſciences as are laudable and worthy our curioſity.

HAPPY is that man, ſays Plato, who, even in his old age, is ſo fortunate as to arrive at the poſſeſſion of wiſdom, and ſentiments agreeable to truth.

VI.

On PROBITY.

HONESTY and profit ſometimes have the appearance of interfering with one another; but it is wrong to imagine ſo, for they both have the ſame rules. Whoever doubts of this truth, muſt be a villain and a knave. By ſuch thoughts he will be led to ſay, This is honourable, but that advantageous; which fatal miſtake of ſeparating things that are in their own nature inſeparable, opens the way to all kinds of wickedneſs and injuſtice. A good man, therefore, though he knew how to get his name put into the laſt wills of wealthy people with the greateſt eaſe, would never make uſe of ſuch a ſecret, although he was ſenſible it would never be the leaſt ſuſpected. A virtuous man, or one whom

we think a juſt man, will never apply to his own uſe what belongs to another. Whoever this aſſertion ſurpriſes, is abſolutely ignorant of what conſtitutes the character of a good man. But would any one take the trouble to unravel this confuſed idea in his own mind, he will find that the good man is one who does all the good he can, and hurts no one, unleſs it be in his own defence. What ſhall we ſay then? Is not he an evil perſon, who, as it were, by the power of ſome drug, has the art to diſinherit the true heirs, that he may ſucceed in their place? But ſome will ſay, Shall a man neglect purſuing that which is profitable and advantageous? I would anſwer ſuch a one, that nothing can tend to our advantage or profit that is unjuſt in itſelf. No one can have any pretence to the character of a good man, who has not learnt this leſſon.

THERE are many caſes wherein profit appears to claſh with honeſty; but then it is neceſſary that we ſhould ſee if this be a real ſuppoſition, or if both be conſiſtent toge-

ther. The following caſes may ſerve as inſtances of this: Suppoſe, for example, that there was a great famine at Rhodes, and a merchant brings there a prodigious quantity of grain from Alexandria, but that he had likewiſe ſeen a number of ſhips laden with grain, all bound for Rhodes; whether, I ſay, ſhould he be ſilent, and ſell his own at as high a price as he could, or tell the Rhodians what he knew?

We will ſuppoſe that he is really a good and virtuous man, and is determined to conceal nothing from them, if he thought ſuch a conduct conſiſtent with virtue; but as he is doubtful whether it be ſo or not, it is required what part he ſhould take in ſuch a conjuncture?

Diogenes the Babylonian, who was a Stoic of the firſt order, for the moſt part, in theſe kind of queſtions, is of a different opinion from his diſciple Antipater, a man of very bright parts. This laſt thinks that the ſeller ſhould diſcover every thing that he

knows to the buyer. On the other hand, Diogenes is of opinion, that only ſo far as the civil law ordains, the ſeller ought to declare the imperfections of his commodities; and in other reſpects to act without fraud; but as ſelling is his occupation, he may ſtrive to do it on the moſt profitable terms he can. I have imported my corn, ſays he, expoſed it to ſale, and here I take not a greater price for it than others; nay, perhaps far leſs, becauſe their commodity is more plenty. To whom then do I injuſtice?

But Antipater, on the contrary, anſwers, What? Are you not obliged to conſult the welfare of mankind? You are born for this, and the law which nature has imprinted in your heart teaches you, that your private advantage, and that of the public, ſhould mutually promote each other: ought you then to keep it a ſecret from theſe men, that there is a great abundance of proviſions coming?

To this Diogenes will reply, that there is a great difference between being ſilent, and

concealing a thing. Nor can I be ſaid to keep any thing a ſecret from you, though I do not inform you about the nature of the Gods, or what will be the end of good men; which is of much greater importance for you to be informed of, than the trifling advantage ariſing from the corn: but the truth is, I have no occaſion to inform you of every thing that might be your advantage to hear. Certainly you are obliged to do it, replies Antipater: this you muſt allow, would you but reflect that mankind are all joined by nature into one ſociety. I own it, replies Diogenes; but is this ſociety of ſuch a nature, that no man can have any property of his own? If it be ſo, then nothing ſhould be ſold, but rather all given away.

AGAIN, ſuppoſe an honeſt man was to ſell his houſe, for ſome inconveniencies which he himſelf only knew: every one imagines it is ſound, although it be infected by the plague: no body knows that ſerpents have infeſted all the rooms of the houſe; that the materials are worth nothing, and that it is altogether

in a very ruinous condition: this no one but the maſter himſelf knows. Now ſhould this man, without letting his purchaſers know what a bad condition his houſe is in, ſell it for much more than he expected; I would know whether or not this action of his be conſiſtent with honeſty and juſtice.

He, without doubt, anſwers Antipater, acts an unfair part, by allowing the purchaſer to fall into a ſnare, which will be very prejudicious to him; is not this the very ſame as ſhewing one the wrong road who has loſt his way; a crime which the Athenians puniſhed with public execrations? Nay, it is ſtill worſe, it is with an intention to cheat our neighbour wilfully and deliberately. But, on the contrary, replied Diogenes, did he oblige you to buy, who did not ſo much as perſuade you to it? He only put up to ſale what was not agreeable to him, and you purchaſed what you pleaſed. Now if thoſe who put up a bill to this effect, "A houſe to be ſold, in good repair, and well built," ſhall not be thought guilty of any deceit, though this character be

quite the reverſe of the condition of the houſe; much leſs ſhould thoſe be blamed who ſay nothing in commendation of it; becauſe where the purchaſer is at free liberty to judge for himſelf, what room can there be for the ſeller to impoſe on him? If we are not obliged to make good every thing we ſay, how can you ſuppoſe that we ſhould perform what we never ſaid? Can any thing be more abſurd than for a merchant to ſpeak ill of his own goods? Or can any thing be thought more ridiculous, than for a public crier, by the owner's orders, to make a proclamation to this effect; "A houſe to ſell that is infected?"

We ſhall preſently decide theſe caſes, for I have not propoſed difficulties but to reſolve them. In ſhort then, it is my opinion, that the corn merchant ſhould not have kept it a ſecret from the Rhodians, nor the ſeller of the houſe from his buyers, what each of them knew. To be merely ſilent on a thing, cannot indeed be called a wicked concealment of it; for this takes place only, when for the ſake of private advantage you deſignedly con-

ceal what you know from others, whoſe intereſt it is that they ſhould be acquainted with it.

But if we blame thoſe who are guilty of concealing deſignedly, what ſhall we think of thoſe who make uſe of lies to anſwer their ends?

C. Canius, a Roman knight, who wanted neither wit nor learning, having gone to Syracuſe, not, as he himſelf uſed to expreſs it, on account of buſineſs, but for retirement, gave out that he wanted to purchaſe ſome gardens, where he and his friends might enjoy themſelves, without being interrupted by intruding viſitants. As ſoon as this came to be well known, one Pythias, a banker of that town, told Canius that he had ſome gardens, which he was not very fond of diſpoſing of, but that he was welcome to make the ſame uſe of them as if they were his own: and at the ſame time invited him to ſup with him in the gardens the next day: to which Canius having agreed, Pythias ſends directly for the

fiſhermen; for, on account of his buſineſs, he had a great deal to ſay with all ſorts of people: he gets them to fiſh the next day before his gardens, and directs them how to act. Canius comes to ſupper at the time appointed, where Pythias had provided an elegant entertainment; and a number of fiſhing-boats make a fine appearance. Every one ſtrives which ſhall be moſt diligent in bringing their draught, and throwing at Pythias's feet what fiſh they had caught. Hey! ſays Canius, how comes all this? whence ſo many boats, and ſuch a great quantity of fiſh? To which Pythias replies, are you amazed at that? All the fiſh in Syracuſe are caught here; it is from this place they have all their water; and as for theſe fiſhermen, they could not live without it. Canius, on hearing this, being very ardent to make the purchaſe, intreats Pythias to ſell him the gardens. He ſeems at firſt very unwilling, but at laſt agrees to it. Canius being a man of ſubſtance, and pleaſed with his bargain, purchaſes them ready fitted up, and gives him his own price: in a word, the writings are drawn, and the whole affair

finiſhed. The following day he invites his friends; but coming rather ſooner than the time, and ſeeing no boats there, he enquires at one of his neighbours, whether it was a holiday with the fiſhermen, as he could ſee none of them? Not as I know, ſays the other: for they do not uſe to fiſh here; which made me the more amazed at what happened yeſterday. Canius is ill pleaſed, but how can he remedy it? for Aquilius, my friend and colleague, had not then publiſhed his Formulas concerning fraud; wherein he makes a definition of fraud, "That it was pretending one thing, and doing another." And indeed this is a very plain deſcription, and ſuch as might be expected from a man of his learning. Pythias, conſequently, and all others, who do one thing, and pretend another, are void of probity, faith, and honour.

REVOLVE and examine your underſtanding carefully, in order to ſee what idea, notion, or repreſentation of a good man you find there. Is it agreeable to the character of ſuch a perſon to lie for his own intereſt; to

ſupplant, cheat, and calumniate? By no means. Is there any thing ſo precious, or any profit ſo much to be deſired, as to make amends for reputation and honour in a man of probity? Can that which we call profit give us any thing ſo valuable in their place, if it robs us of honour, juſtice, and the character of a good man? What does it ſignify, whether one be really transformed from a man into a brute; or if he carry with him all the ſavageneſs of a brute, under the outward figure of a man?

It is not difficult to reſolve caſes of profit and loſs. But ſhould one's life be in danger, ſo that it was abſolutely neceſſary, either to take the advantage of another, or to periſh himſelf, in what manner ought he to behave? The ſuppoſition is poſſible, as in a ſhipwreck, ſhould one find a weak perſon ſitting on a plank; or in the rout of an army, ſhould he come up with one of the wounded on horſe-back: would this man, for his own ſafety, turn the one off the plank, or pull the other from his horſe? Undoubtedly he would do

neither, if he acted agreeably to the dictates of juſtice.

XANTIPPUS, the Lacedemonian general, having ſurpriſed and taken M. Attilius Regulus priſoner in Africa, in his ſecond conſulſhip, he ſent him to the ſenate, after having firſt made him take an oath to return to Carthage, unleſs certain priſoners of good families were reſtored to the Carthagenians. When he arrived at Rome, an appearance of advantage preſented itſelf to his view, which he imagined to be quite void of reality, as appears from the event. This was the advantage, to abide in his native country, to remain at home with his wife and children, and, by viewing his misfortune as the common fate of war, to hold the rank of the conſular dignity: and can any one doubt that theſe are profitable? But what ſhall we ſay, the truly brave and courageous deny it. Now, what greater authority would you demand? For it is the ſingular property of theſe two virtues, to be afraid of nothing, to look down on all enjoyments, and to think that nothing can

poſſibly happen to a man intolerable. How then did he act? He came into the ſenate, laid his commiſſion before them, but would not give his opinion, pretending that he was not entitled to the character of a ſenator, while he remained under the ſacred obligation of an oath to the enemy. And (though ſome, no doubt, will call him fool, thus to be againſt his own intereſt!) ſaid, that it was not for the welfare of the ſtate to reſtore the priſoners; for that they were good officers, and juſt in their prime, whereas age had rendered him uſeleſs. In fine, his advice was taken, the priſoners were detained, and he returned to Carthage; neither the love he bore his native country, nor that of his family and friends, being able to prevent him; and notwithſtanding, he was certain that he was going to put himſelf into the hands of the moſt cruel of enemies, and endure the ſevereſt tortures: but to balance all this, he thought that he ought to keep the obligation of an oath inviolable. His hard fate was more tolerable even when he was ſuffering the cruelleſt of all deaths, than if he had grown old in his own

houſe, covered with the ſhame of having ſtained his conſular dignity by perjury and captivity.

ALTHOUGH king Pyrrhus, without any provocation, had made war with the Romans, and though the diſpute with this great and powerful king was for no leſs a prize than empire itſelf, yet when a deſerter from him came into Fabricius's camp, and promiſed, if he would recompenſe him, to return privately in the ſame manner he had come into Pyrrhus's camp, and deſtroy the king by poiſon; Fabricius gave orders that he ſhould be immediately taken back to Pyrrhus; the ſenate approved of this action. But if we conſider only what has an advantageous appearance, and what for the moſt part paſſes for ſuch; this one deſerter might have finiſhed a very dangerous war, and taken off a formidable rival for empire: but as they were contending for glory, it would have been a continual reproach and infamy to have got the advantage of him by baſe treachery, and not by valour.

I WOULD willingly know what can be the meaning of the famous balance of Critolaus, who thinks that if the goods of the mind be put into one ſcale, and thoſe of the body, with all external advantages, into the other, yet the former would be the heavier, though the whole earth and ſeas were added to the latter.

VII.

On ELOQUENCE.

NOTHING, in my opinion, is more admirable than to be capable to attract the attention of a whole aſſembly, to pleaſe their underſtandings, and to be able to direct or diſſuade as one would. In all countries, where the people enjoy liberty in times of profound peace, this met always with the greateſt encouragement, and gained the moſt credit. Now is there any thing ſo worthy of our admiration, as that among a great number of men, there ſhould only one be found, or at leaſt but few, who are able to exerciſe thoſe talents which nature has granted to all: or can any thing ſo delightfully flatter our admiration or ear, as a diſcourſe which adds the luſtre and embelliſhment of expreſſion to the wiſeſt ſentiments? What empire, what great-

neſs is comparable to his, who by a ſingle expreſſion can rule the caprices of the people, the conſciences of judges, and even the majeſtic gravity of the ſenate? Beſides, can any thing be more free, more like a king, or more truly ſhew a great ſoul, than to aſſiſt thoſe who ſtand in need of it, retrieve the oppreſſed, protect the weak, and ſave citizens from exile? What, on the contrary, is ſo neceſſary, as to be always armed, ſo that we may avenge ourſelves when we are injured, and annoy the malefactor.

BUT not to dwell on the forum, the ſenate, the noſtrum, and the bar; what is more acceptable to human nature, or ſo pleaſing an amuſement when retired from buſineſs, as the agreeable livelineſs of polite converſation. In this our characteriſtic pre-eminence conſiſts over the animal world, that we talk together; and are able to communicate, by language, our moſt ſecret ideas. To be able then to excel other men in that very thing whence they derive their ſuperiority over brutes; who would not be pleaſed with the thought,

and do their utmoſt, in order to acquire the dear accompliſhment?

But let us come to the principal advantages of eloquence. What power, but hers, could have gathered together the diſperſed individuals of mankind, or have made them alter their ferocious and wild way of living, for the civilized and poliſhed life of ſociety? For once men, like wild beaſts, wandered up and down in the fields, and lived in the ſame manner as they did. Every thing almoſt was performed by corporal ſtrength; contrivance and reaſon had no part in their actions. In thoſe times, they neither ſtudied religion, nor moral duties: lawful marriages were not heard of: none could be certain which were their own children: nor knew they any thing of the principles of equity. The paſſions, in the midſt of ignorance and error, maintained a blind and tyrannic ſway, injuring the powers of the body, thoſe dangerous partizans, for their own purpoſes. In this time, ſome great man of ſuperior underſtanding diſcovered, that mankind were capable to execute the greateſt

enterprizes, could any one but find means to inſtruct them, or ſet them to work. In order to ſucceed in this, he, by ſome means, got mankind to aſſemble together; who had been ſcattered in the fields, or lurking in the wild receſſes of the foreſt. Upon his ſtriving to make them ſenſible of whatever was honourable and uſeful, they at firſt proved ſtubborn, ſuch truths being unuſual to them; afterwards moved by reaſon and eloquence, they heard men attentively; till at laſt, from being wild and ferocious monſters, he brought them to be mild and humane.

A CHANGE, ſo ſudden, and ſo conſiderable, was doubtleſs the work of eloquence, as much as reaſon. Nay even when cities were built, what but the powerful perſuaſion of eloquence could enforce the dictates of reaſon, ordain the obſervance of good faith, ſupport juſtice, accuſtom mankind to ſubordination, and perſuade them that it was their duty to ſpare no labour, but to ſacrifice even their

life, for the public good? Certainly no man of great power, if not prevailed upon by ſome fine and elegant ſpeech, would deign to ſubmit his affairs to be determined by law, without being obliged to do it; would put himſelf on an equal footing with thoſe over whom he could eaſily keep up his ſuperiority; or willingly give up a cuſtom, of all others the moſt pleaſing; eſpecially, ſince it had got a habit, equal to that of nature itſelf, on account of its long duration.

THEY pretend that there are different kinds of orators, as well as poets: but it is not ſo; for of theſe laſt there are many kinds, different from each other, as the Epic, Lyric, Tragic, and Comic. In tragedy, the leaſt mixture of comedy has a bad effect; and it is as blameable to mix any thing that is tragic with comedy: and ſo in other kinds of poetry, each has its proportion, which is eaſily diſcerned by people of taſte. But ſhould any one thus reckon the different kinds of orators, as the grave, the ſublime, and the copious; the ſimple, the ſubtile, and the conciſe; or i-

magine others that hold a rank between theſe: he may affirm all this of orators, but not of the art itſelf. For with reſpect to the latter, we look for it in its greateſt perfection; but with regard to orators, we mention what they really are.

A PERFECT orator is he who can inſtruct, pleaſe, and move his audience. To inſtruct is indiſpenſable; to pleaſe, neceſſary. It muſt be allowed that ſome perform theſe better than others; but this inequality conſiſts in the degree, and not in the kind. Therefore every orator is reckoned good, bad, or indifferent, in proportion as theſe qualifications unite in him: yet all go under the name of orator, as the worſt of painters are ſtill called painters. It is not the art, but the talent that makes the difference. No one therefore merits the name of orator, who has not a deſire to vie even with Demoſthenes. Menander, on the contrary, would not reſemble Homer, becauſe he employed himſelf in a quite different kind of poetry. But this has nothing to do with regard to orators; one uſes

a ſtrong pathetic ſtile, void of all obſcure ſubtilities; another is not ſo fond of purity and beauty of expreſſion, as arguments and witticiſms: yet ſuch ſingularities cannot certainly enter the character of a compleat orator, in whom all good qualities muſt unite, though they may be found in an indifferent one.

It has often indeed appeared ſtrange to me, upon a review of the moſt able and greateſt men, why there have not ſo many diſtinguiſhed themſelves for eloquence, as in any other art. Look what way you will, you will find a number who have excelled not only in inferior arts, but in thoſe of the utmoſt importance. Now who is there, if he reckons the abilities of eminent men by their great uſefulneſs, but would prefer the general to the orator? Neverthelefs, Rome has produced a great number of famous generals; whilſt ſcarce any can be cited that have been good orators. There have been many in our time, and more in the days of our fathers and anceſtors, who, by their wiſdom and prudence, were very capable of governing the ſtate;

whereas for many centuries, there were none that could really be called great orators; and indeed every age has ſcarcely been able to furniſh a tolerable one.

Now that none may imagine that the compariſon is not fair, between eloquence and the merit of a general, or the prudence of a good ſenator; and that eloquence ſhould rather be put in competition with thoſe ſtudies which are connected with the ſciences and other branches of literature; let us behold theſe very ſciences, and ſee what numbers of great men have cut a figure in each of them, and then we ſhall be able to form a judgment, how trifling the number of orators are at preſent, or have been in former times.

You know that that ſcience, which the Greeks call philoſophy, is looked upon by the moſt learned men to be the parent and ſource of all the liberal arts: yet it would not be an eaſy matter to reckon, how many of its profeſſors have been famous for their great learning, and the variety and profoundneſs of their

ſtudies; and who have not limited themſelves to one ſingle branch of knowledge, but by an unwearied application to ſtudy, and the ſound deductions of reaſon, have extended their views to every thing. Every one, I dare ſay, knows that the ſtudy of Mathematicks is very intricate, and requires a great deal of penetration; and yet ſuch a number have been famous for their knowledge in this ſcience, that it would appear, no man ever attentively applied to it, that did not gain what he propoſed. Who ever ſet himſelf ſeriouſly to learn muſick, or thoſe branches of learning called grammar, and did not gain a perfect knowledge of the almoſt infinite number of things, whereof theſe arts conſiſt?

I THINK I may ſafely ſay, that there have not been ſo many who have excelled in poetry, as in other ſciences, within the whole bounds of the liberal arts. But yet, if you examine thoſe that Greece and Rome have produced, you will find that the number of good orators is far inferior to that of poets.

BUT what makes it appear ſtill more wonderful is, that the knowledge of the other ſciences is for the moſt part deduced from abſtruſe principles, and thoſe not commonly known; whereas the orator only employs ſuch expreſſions as are made uſe of in common life. In other arts, every thing is thought to be moſt excellent, that is raiſed above the underſtanding and comprehenſion of the ignorant; but in matters of eloquence, it is blameable in the higheſt degree, to vary from the received maxims of common ſenſe, or the uſual form of ſpecch.

Now we cannot with any pretence ſay, that more people have applied themſelves to the cultivation of the other ſciences, or that they are attracted by more exalted pleaſures, greater hopes, or rewards, in the purſuit of them. For without mentioning Greece, which has always been eager to excel other nations in point of eloquence; or Athens, that parent of literature, to which the art of oratory owes its origin; certainly no ſtudy was ever ſo ſucceſsful in this city, as that of elo-

quence. For after an univerſal empire was eſtabliſhed, and the duration of peace had procured leiſure, every youth, who was fond of glory, thought no trouble too much, in order to obtain the art of ſpeaking. Indeed, at firſt, knowing nothing of method, unacquainted with the great advantage of exerciſe, and not ſuppoſing there were any rules that belonged to this art; the progreſs they made in it, was owing entirely to the force of their own reaſon and genius. But as ſoon as they knew the taſte of the Greeks, and had heard their orators, read their books, and taken maſters to teach them, the thirſt our countrymen had for eloquence is incredible. A number of important affairs of all kinds, afforded them frequent practice, which is ſuperior to all maſters, and what they learned by ſtudy. Beſides, the greateſt rewards were annexed to this profeſſion, as public favour, riches, and honour. And as to genius, it is evident from many conſiderations, that the Romans in this reſpect far ſurpaſſed all the reſt of the world.

AFTER hearing all this, can we then be

ſurprized, that there have been ſo few orators in all times and places in the world? But in reality, the art of oratory is more noble, and demands the knowledge of more arts and ſciences, than is generally ſuppoſed. For what other reaſon can be aſſigned, why in ſuch great numbers of ſtudents, that are endowed with good natural parts, ſo few ſucceed; but the greatneſs and difficulty of the undertaking, though there be abundance of maſters, a great variety of cauſes, and the greateſt rewards joined to the attainment?

THEREFORE to form an orator, beſides an univerſal knowledge, without which the fineſt flow of language will make but a trifling and ridiculous appearance; I ſay, beſides this, the ſtile muſt alſo be beautified by the moſt exact arrangement, as well as choice of words; a complete knowledge of all the affections which nature has given to mankind, is alſo proper; becauſe the whole power of eloquence ſhould be exerted, in order to calm and rouſe the minds of the auditory. Join to this, a certain gracefulneſs, an enlivening raillery, the education of a gentleman, and a quick

turn for repartee, and attacking an adverſary in a polite and delicate manner. One ſhould likewiſe know about antiquity, and have a number of examples to produce; nor ſhould we be ignorant of laws and juriſprudence. Why ſhould I ſpeak on action itſelf, which muſt be ruled by the motion of the body, the geſture, countenance, and manner of commanding one's voice? We may judge of this difficulty from the frivolous art of comedians, and repreſentations on the ſtage, where every one ſtudies to regulate in a becoming manner his voice, geſtures, and countenance; yet every one knows, that there have been very few, whom we can patiently behold. Should I mention memory, that univerſal depoſitory of all knowledge; to whoſe keeping, if the reflections, inventions, and expreſſions of the orator are not truſted, they muſt infallibly be loſt, if the uſes were ever ſo excellent in themſelves.

Since therefore eloquence re-unites ſo many talents, each of which apart requires ſo much care; let us no longer be aſhamed that there are ſo few good orators.

VIII.

On FRIENDSHIP.

EXCEPTING wiſdom, I look upon friendſhip as the richeſt preſent which the gods have beſtowed on us. Some prefer opulence, ſome health, ſome power, others honours, and a great many pleaſures. This laſt is common to brutes; and with regard to the reſt, they are frail and uncertain, depending leſs on our own prudence, than on the caprice of fortune.

THOSE, on the contrary, who rely chiefly on virtue act an excellent part: but then it is this virtue that begets and maintains friendſhip, which could not by any means ſubſiſt without it.

WE take virtue in the meaning put upon it in common life, and our own language;

nor do we, with ſome learned men, meaſure it by ſuperb epithets: we alſo eſteem thoſe as good men, who are moſtly thought to be ſo; as the Paulus's, the Cato's, the Gallus's, the Scipio's the Philus's. We do not demand greater models than theſe in a common life; whence we do not mention characters that are not to be found any where.

A FRIENDSHIP thus ariſing among men of this turn, has greater advantages than I am able to expreſs. Is he fit to live, as Ennius expreſſes it, that cannot confide in a friend? What pleaſure is comparable to that of having one to whom we can ſpeak as freely as with ourſelves. Where would be the boaſted advantages of proſperity, had we not friends to partake of it with us? And as for adverſity, it would be almoſt inſupportable, had we not a friend to eaſe us when oppreſſed with grief.

IN ſhort, all the other objects of our deſires are moſtly limited to their proper uſes; riches to be uſed; credit to be eſteemed; honours to be praiſed; pleaſures to be enjoyed;

health, not to endure pain, and to be in a condition to diſcharge the duties depending on the body. But friendſhip has innumerable advantages; it is preſent, turn what way you will: it is every where admitted, is never troubleſome or unſeaſonable. Whence, as the ſaying is, we can as well be without fire and water, as without friendſhip.

It is not common and ordinary friendſhip which I am now mentioning, though that likewiſe has its uſe and pleaſure; but of what is perfect and ſincere, ſuch as exiſted between thoſe few great men we have already mentioned. For it not only gives a new eclat to proſperity, but even makes adverſity leſs intolerable, by ſharing and communicating it. Now amongſt the numerous and great advantages of friendſhip, I take this to be the moſt material, in giving us good hopes of futurity, and not ſuffering our minds to be caſt down, much leſs our courage to fail when under affliction.

Besides, to have a friend, is having a

perfect reſemblance of ourſelves. So that abſence cannot ſeparate, want make poor, ſickneſs weaken, or, what is ſtill more amazing, death put an end to their life. The remembrance is ſo conſtant, the affection ſo ſincere, and the regard ſo elevated which are entertained by their ſurviving friends, that the life of the latter ſeems a merit, and the death of the former a happineſs.

When I am meditating on friendſhip, one thing in particular deſerves conſideration; and that is, whether it owes its riſe to the weakneſs and wants of mankind; that, by a reciprocal exchange of good offices, every one may receive from his friend what he has not himſelf; and, in his turn, make up the defects of his friend? Or, ſuffering this to be indeed a property of friendſhip, whether it has no other cauſe that is more antient, more noble, and allied nearer to nature itſelf?

It is love (whence, in the Latin language, the word friendſhip is derived) that moſtly

begets benevolence. Indeed, favours may be got even from thoſe for whom friendſhip is only pretended; and who are ſolicited merely to ſerve the preſent occaſion. But there can be no diſguiſe or deceit in true friendſhip: every thing muſt come from the heart, and be ſincere, that makes a part of it. Therefore friendſhip, on this account, ſeems to me to attribute more to nature, than to the wants of mankind; and to be owing more to the good affections of our mind, than to any reflexion on the great uſe that attends it.

We have an image of this ſenſation even in beaſts. They are fond of their young ones, and are beloved by them with ſo ſincere a regard, at leaſt for ſome time, that it evidently appears to be the dictates of nature. This inſtinct is more viſible ſtill in men. As firſt, from the tenderneſs which exiſts between parents and their children; that cannot be broken, without expoſing themſelves to the moſt abominable of all crimes. When we find a perſon whoſe nature and character agrees exactly with our own, we are affected with a like

ſenſation of benevolence towards him; becauſe we ſeem to ſee in ſuch a one the bright effluence of virtue and goodneſs. For there is nothing more attracting or more lovely than virtue: inſomuch that we are even intereſted for thoſe whom we have never ſeen. Every one has a particular regard and veneration for the memory of C. Fabricius, and M. Curius; though they were dead before we came into the world. And who is there, on the contrary, but hates Tarquin the proud, Sp. Caſſius, and Sp. Mælius? There have been two generals, Pyrrhus and Hannibal, who contended with us for the empire in the heart of Italy: one of theſe was never much the object of our averſion, on account of his generoſity; whereas the cruelty of the other has brought upon him the eternal hatred of this ſtate. If virtue then has ſo many attractions, that we admire it in thoſe whom we never ſaw; and, what is ſtill more, even in our enemies; is it ſurpriſing that the affections of men make impreſſions on us, when we diſcover virtue and goodneſs in thoſe with whom we may enjoy a friendly intercourſe?

HOWEVER, I confeſs that good offices are much ſtrengthened by intimate acquaintance, and marks of eſteem; and if we join theſe with inclination, that firſt motion of the heart, there reſults a height of benevolence from ſuch a conjunction that cannot be expreſſed. Should any one ſuppoſe that all this is the effect of the natural weakneſs of mankind, in order to ſupply their indigence and mutual wants; this would be undervaluing friendſhip, and giving it a very ignoble origin. If this was the caſe, he would be the moſt proper for friendſhip who is the moſt ſenſible of his own imperfections; but it is however quite the contrary: for in proportion as every man is confident of his own ability, and has ſuch a ſtock of wiſdom and virtue, with every other proper qualification, within himſelf, as not to have occaſion for any foreign aſſiſtances, ſo much the greater deſire would he have for friendſhip, and the more careful he would be in cultivating it. Had Africanus any need of my aſſiſtance? Not at all. Nor indeed did he ſtand in need of me: but being delighted with his virtues,

I loved him, and he alſo had a regard for me, which was occaſioned, perhaps, by the good opinion he had conceived of my manners. As we became better acquainted, our mutual benevolence increaſed. Now, although this friendſhip was in great ſervice to us both on many occaſions, yet it was not the view of them that gave riſe to it.

FOR as we do acts of generoſity and kindneſs not with any intention to have a return, ſuch a conduct not being conſiſtent with the nature of a favour; but from our natural inclination to beneficence: friendſhip, in the ſame manner, in my opinion, ought not to be cultivated for mercenary views, the pleaſure of loving and being beloved being advantage enough. We think quite differently from thoſe who refer every thing to pleaſure: and no wonder that they never have any taſte for what is excellent, ſublime, and divine, for their thoughts are wholly taken up with ſo mean and baſe an object. Therefore let us not mention them any more. But as to ourſelves, it is proper we ſhould know that

the agreeable affections of love and benevolence ariſe naturally from a diſcovery of virtue. Thoſe who are thus affected, draw near and unite themſelves, that they may enjoy the company and ſocial virtues of the perſon beloved; they aim at an equality of friendſhip, and are fonder of doing good offices, than of a return. Whence ariſes a commendable emulation between them. Thus the advantages of friendſhip will be very great; and its origin, drawn from nature, both more ſolid and laſting, than that from the indigence of mankind, and likewiſe agreeable to truth: for was intereſt the only tie of friendſhip, a change in the former could not fail to diſſolve the latter. But as nature cannot be changed, true friendſhip muſt of courſe be eternal.

I UNDERSTAND that in Greece ſome men, who are ranked amongſt the wiſeſt ſages, have taken up very ſtrange notions on this ſubject; but then there is nothing can eſcape their ſophiſtry. They tell you, that we ſhould avoid having too many friends, leſt we involve

ourſelves in the diſquietudes of a multitude; that every one has enough, and perhaps too much buſineſs of his own; that it is very troubleſome to be concerned in other people's affairs; and that it is better to hold the reins of friendſhip in ſuch an unconfined manner, that we may always have it in our power to ſtreighten or ſlacken them as we think proper. For theſe men think, that tranquillity conſtitutes the chief ingredient of a happy life; and this it is impoſſible for the mind to enjoy, while one perſon labours, if we may uſe the expreſſion, with a number of people's concerns.

OTHERS are ſaid to be of opinion, what is ſtill more unreaſonable, and which I have already ſlightly mentioned, that friendſhip ought to be contracted, not out of benevolence and affection, but mutual aid and ſelf-defence. Hence it is, they ſay, that every man's deſires of friendſhip are greater in proportion as his ſtrength and ability is leſs; alſo, that women more than men, ſolicit the aid of friendſhip, the poor more than the

rich, and thoſe on whom fortune frowns more than thoſe on whom ſhe ſmiles.

CHARMING philoſophy! They might as well take the ſun out of the world, as bereave mankind of friendſhip, which is the beſt and moſt agreeable gift of heaven.

SHOULD men who are intoxicated with pleaſures, take upon them to reaſon about friendſhip, which they are quite ignorant of both from practice and theory? They do not deſerve our attention; for who, in the name of goodneſs! would like to live in the greateſt affluence, on condition neither to love nor be beloved by any one? Such is the life of a tyrant, quite inconſiſtent with ſincere affection and fidelity, and all ſolid aſſurance of benevolence, in which every thing baniſhes friendſhip, gives ſuſpicion, and cauſes anxiety: for who can love a man whom he dreads, or one who is afraid of him? An hypocritical regard is only paid them for a time; but ſhould fortune not favour them, as it fre-

quently happens, it will then be ſeen how many friends they had.

TARQUIN, when in exile, is reported to have ſaid, that he only then knew who were his true and falſe friends, when he could reward neither of them as they deſerved. Though I ſhould not be amazed, if a perſon of his proud and haughty temper could not find a ſincere friend in the univerſe. And as a man of his character could not be beloved; ſo the greateſt part of thoſe who are very powerful have that common to them: for fortune is both blind herſelf, and likewiſe moſtly makes them ſo too to whom ſhe is favourable. Hence it is, they are frequently puffed up with pride and ſelf-conceit: and, indeed, nothing can be more inſupportable than a fool in proſperity. We likewiſe have ſeen ſome who were formerly of a very courteous and obliging behaviour, who, when they have got power and authority, or better circumſtances, have neglected their old friends, in order to get new ones.

Now what can be more ridiculous, than for thoſe who are in good circumſtances, to procure themſelves whatever can be got for money, as horſes, ſervants, fine cloaths, and coſtly plate; but think not of acquiring friends, who, if the expreſſion may be allowed, are the moſt ſplendid and beſt furniture in life. As to our other acquiſitions, we know not for whoſe ſake we are at ſo much trouble in getting them, as they are deſtined to go to the ſtrongeſt; but the poſſeſſion of friendſhip is certain and durable. Beſides, granting all the enjoyments in the diſpoſal of fortune to be durable, yet it is impoſſible to make life agreeable, if we have not friends.

One point to be eſtabliſhed, is, what bounds ſhould be preſcribed to friendſhip and benevolence? There are three different opinions I know concerning this, none of which I approve of. The firſt is, that we ſhould love our friend as ourſelves; the ſecond, that our benevolence to our friends ſhould be exactly proportioned to theirs for us, and the third, that we ſhould think of our friends according

to the value they ſet on themſelves. I cannot altogether agree to any of theſe three opinions.

As to the firſt, it is quite falſe, that every man ſhould be in the ſame manner affected towards his friend as to himſelf; for how many things are there that we do for a friend, which we would never do for ourſelves? Thus, to turn ſuppliant, and petition a man of no worth; alſo, to treat any one with bitter expreſſions of reproach, and rail immoderately at him; are what cannot with any good grace be done in our own caſe, but are highly worthy of praiſe with reſpect to our friends. There are many caſes wherein good men, in order to promote the intereſt of their friends, detract much from their own intereſts, or ſuffer it to be done.

The ſecond defines friendſhip by an equality of benevolent affections and good offices. But to meaſure exactly the kindneſſes on both ſides, is to make too mean and particular an eſtimate of it. I think that true

friendſhip is more generous and noble; and examines not ſo narrowly, leſt we have returned more favours than we have received. For there is no reaſon to be afraid that any thing which we do will be loſt, or fall to the ground.

As to the third opinion, that the value which every man ſets on himſelf, ought to be the ſtandard of the eſteem paid him by his friends, is worſt of all: for it is not a rare caſe to find people who are more humble than what is neceſſary, and who too eaſily deſpair of bettering their circumſtances. It cannot be therefore the part of a friend to act as they do. On the contrary, he ſhould endeavour to chear up his friend, and make him have more flattering proſpects, and a better opinion of himſelf.

We muſt find ſome other definition of friendſhip: but let us firſt mention a maxim that Scipio uſed highly to condemn; which was, that no tenet could be more contrary to true friendſhip, than the opinion of him who

maintained, *that we ſhould love, as if we were certain that we ſhould one day hate.* He could not be perſuaded that this was a maxim of Bias, one of the ſeven wiſe men, as was generally thought, but rather an apothegm of ſome debauchee, a perſon fired with ambition, or one who makes every thing ſubſervient to his own intereſt. For, in effect, how can we love any one, and at the ſame time think that he will be our enemy? Beſides, at this rate, we muſt wiſh that he may be often in the wrong, in order that we may have the more opportunities of reproving him: and, on the other hand, one muſt envy the good ſucceſs of his friends, and be grieved and vexed at their virtuous behaviour. This maxim therefore, whoever is its author, is a mortal enemy to friendſhip. The following precept ſhould rather have been given, "that we "ſhould be careful in contracting friendſhips, "leſt our affection ſhould ſettle on one who "afterwards may be capable of deſerving our "hatred." But even if we ſhould have had the misfortune to be deceived in our friendſhips, Scipio ſays, that rather than think of a

rupture, we ſhould patiently bear our misfortunes.

In my opinion, the rules then which ſhould be preſcribed are theſe; that among friends of refined morals, every thing ſhould be in common, and they ſhould without reſerve impart their ſeveral intentions and deſires to each other; alſo granting that our friends may chance to deviate a little from ſtrict juſtice, yet, if their life and honour be at ſtake, they ſhould be ſupported, though we ſhould go a little out of our way to do them ſervice, unleſs it be abſolutely the baſeſt diſhoneſty: for it is only to a certain degree that friendſhip will excuſe us.

Those whom we chuſe for friends ſhould be men of reſolution, conſtancy, and a ſteady temper: but there are not many of this character to be found; and it is not eaſy to know them, till experience has proved them. However, we muſt commence friendſhip before this be done; for which reaſon it is im-

poſſible to obtain any previous opportunities to try them.

EVERY prudent man therefore ſhould, like an able horſeman, endeavour to curb the impetuoſity of his benevolence; that friendſhip, to uſe the expreſſion, may be proved in the ſame manner as horſes of manege, by trying the morals of our friends in ſome particular point. Some will ſhew their inconſtancy on account of a ſmall ſum of money; others, who cannot be wrought on by a ſmall ſum, will diſcover themſelves for a greater. But allowing that ſome ſhould be found, who think it mean to prefer money to friendſhip; yet where will we find any who would not rather have riches, honours, power, dignity, and magiſtracies, than it; or, if all theſe be propoſed on the one hand, and the duties of friendſhip on the other, who is there that would not readily prefer the former? For the temptation of power is too great for the human heart to reſiſt, and men think themſelves very excuſable, though they obtain it at the expence of friendſhip; becauſe it is not with-

out great reaſon they do ſo. Whence it is very difficult to meet with true friendſhip among the votaries of ambition, and miniſters of ſtate. For indeed, where can we find any perſon who would not rather do his endeavours to get himſelf preferred, than his friend?

We even ſometimes experience the hard neceſſity of coming to a rupture; for I am now ſpeaking of that in ordinary life, and not of ſuch as is formed among wiſe men. Sometimes it happens, that our friends are guilty of offences both againſt ourſelves and others, the ſcandal whereof for the moſt part falls upon us. We ſhould therefore neglect and drop all friendly intercourſe with theſe; and not abruptly, but rather by degrees, as I have heard Cato ſay: unleſs they have committed ſome very bad crime, ſo that it is neither honourable, right, nor even poſſible, for us to delay one moment to break with the guilty perſon.

Many people are ſo unjuſt, not to ſay un-

reaſonable, as to want their friends to be what they themſelves cannot arrive at; and would have more from them, than they would willingly give in return. However, it is neceſſary that we firſt learn to be good ourſelves, before we cultivate friendſhip with thoſe who are ſo. The friendſhip we have been recommending may be founded on a ſolid baſis among ſuch as theſe; becauſe men joined by benevolence will not only triumph over thoſe paſſions with which the reſt of mankind are inſlaved, but alſo take a delight in juſtice and equity, and are diſpoſed to do good offices for one another: nor will they ever demand any thing but what is conformable to honour and probity; and beſides love and eſteem, will have a mutual reſpect for each other. To rob friendſhip of this reſpect, is making it loſe its fineſt ornament; and it is very wrong for any one to think that all ſorts of offences and licentiouſneſs are ſufferable amongſt friends. Friendſhip was given by nature to aſſiſt virtue, and not to favour vice.

The uſefulneſs of friendſhip, is the only

thing in the world of which all mankind are agreed. Many even deſpiſe virtue, and look upon it as a kind of vanity and oſtentation. There is a number that view riches with contempt, who are ſatisfied with a little, and pleaſed with frugality in meat and dreſs. And as to honours, which are ſo longed after by ſome, there are many others who have ſo bad an opinion of them, as to think nothing ſo frivolous and inſignificant. Thus it is alſo in a number of other caſes; that which delights ſome, is little eſteemed by others. But all the world are agreed about friendſhip: ſtateſmen and philoſophers, the men of buſineſs, and thoſe who are ſolely devoted to pleaſures, all concur that there is no living without friendſhip, at leaſt in ſuch a manner as is not altogether unbecoming a gentleman.

I KNOW not how it is, but friendſhip always inſinuates itſelf, in all ages, and among all ranks of men; nor is there any condition of life void of its influence: nay, could we imagine a man of ſo ſavage and ſurly a diſpoſition, as to ſhun and hate human ſociety, like

a certain man of Athens called Timon; yet a perſon of this character cannot live at eaſe, till he meets with a perſon on whom he may vent his bad humour.

We ſhould be better ſatisfied of this truth, ſhould ſome God, if the ſuppoſition may be allowed, deprive us of the ſociety of mankind, and carry us into a deſert, where we ſhould be abundantly ſupplied with all the neceſſaries of life; but make it impoſſible for us to ſee the face of man. Who could be ſo hard-hearted, as to ſupport life at this price, and in this frightful ſolitude find a taſte for the pleaſures that are offered him?

I think therefore that there is nothing more true than the ſaying of Archytas of Tarentum, as I have heard it told by our fathers, who had it from theirs; *That if any one could mount up into heaven, and there view the ſtructure of the univerſe, and the beauty of the ſtars; yet this ſight, although it would have been the moſt wonderful and delightful, would be inſipid to him, if he has no friend to relate it*

to. So far it is true, that nature has a great averſion to ſolitude, and always leans, as it were, againſt ſome prop; which ſupport gives us moſt pleaſure, when proceeding from our moſt agreeable friends.

THE caſe of that perſon whoſe ears are ſhut againſt truth, is ſurely deſperate; ſo that he cannot even bear to hear it from the mouth of his friend. For Cato wiſely remarks; *that ſome men are under greater obligations to their inveterate enemies, than to ſuch friends as appear always complaiſant. The former often tell the truth, but the latter never.* It is ſurely very unreaſonable in thoſe, who being reminded of their duty, give themſelves not the leaſt trouble about what they ought chiefly to lay to heart; and are vexed, where there is no ſufficient cauſe. The commiſſion of a fault gives them not the leaſt uneaſineſs, but the being reproved for it does: whereas they ought to be grieved on account of the fault, and well pleaſed with the admonition.

SINCE therefore it is a peculiar property of true friendſhip as well to give as to take advice; and as one ought to be done with freedom, not ill-nature; the other received patiently, and not with reluctance; ſo it ſhould be laid down for a maxim, that flattery, and a complaiſant, cajoling behaviour, is very hurtful to friendſhip. For though many names are neceſſary to expreſs the vice of thoſe trifling deceivers, whoſe whole diſcourſe is in order to pleaſe, and not to be ſubſervient to truth; yet as diſſimulation is in all caſes faulty, becauſe it corrupts and prevents us from diſcerning truth: ſo it is in a ſingular manner repugnant to friendſhip: for it deſtroys truth, without which the bare name of friendſhip will be of little effect.

AS every perſon has not always one and the ſame mind, but is changeable, unconſtant, and various, how can ſeveral minds be formed, as it were, into one, by the power of friendſhip? For can any thing be ſo unnaturally pliant and wavering as the mind of one who not only ſuits himſelf to the will and ſenti-

ments, but even the leaſt nod or ſign of another?

Does he affirm a thing or it deny?
I do the ſame: and ſtill, you're right, I cry.

As Terence makes Gnatho a Paraſite ſay: it would therefore be the greateſt imprudence to have any thing to do with ſuch people. However, there are a number like Gnatho in manners, though they are ſuperior to him in birth, reputation, and fortune. The cajoling condeſcenſion of ſuch men is the moſt irkſome, as their vanity is ſupported by the authority due to their rank. But however, we may, with a little attention, as eaſily diſtinguiſh a flattering friend from a true one, as falſe and painted things from thoſe that are natural and true.

IX.

On OLD AGE.

TO thoſe who have no reſource of happineſs within themſelves, every part of life hangs heavy: but they cannot think any thing unreaſonable, that proceeds from the ſtated order of nature. In which claſs we may, in a particular manner, rank old age: the arriving at which is the univerſal wiſh of all mankind; who when they have obtained it make it no leſs the ſubject of complaint. Such is the inconſtancy and perverſeneſs of unreaſonable men. Old age, ſay they, has come ſooner upon us than we expected. But if they have reckoned wrong, whoſe fault is it? For pray, does old age come any quicker upon youth, than youth upon infancy? Again, is old age more burthenſome at eighty, than it would be at eight hundred years, were

we to live ſo long? For the part of life that is paſt, if it be ever ſo long, can give no comfort or ſatisfaction to an old age that is ridiculous in itſelf.

Now if it be true that my wiſdom delights you (and I wiſh that it may anſwer the idea you have formed, and the ſurname which they have given me!) it conſiſts in this, that I have followed the beſt of all guides, that is, nature; and obeyed her commands as I would thoſe of a God: having performed in a becoming manner the former parts of my life, it is not probable that nature ſhould neglect, like an ignorant poet, the laſt act of a piece. In ſhort, like the fruits of the earth when arrived at a certain degree of maturity, it is neceſſary there ſhould be a laſt period of life, that withers, as it were, and drops down of itſelf; which a wiſe man ought patiently to bear: for if it be not to oppoſe nature, why do we, after the manner of the giants, declare war againſt the Gods.

WHEN I conſider ſeriouſly, I find four rea-

ſons why old age appears to attack our happineſs. The firſt is, that it renders us unfit for buſineſs; the ſecond, that it weakens our bodies; the third, that it moſtly deprives us of all pleaſure; and the fourth, that it is not far diſtant from death. Let us examine then, if you pleaſe, what force and ſolidity there is in each of them.

Does old age diſqualify us for buſineſs? For what buſineſs pray? Is it ſuch as demands the ſtrength and vigour of youth? Are there then no occupations fit for old age, that the rational part of man, even although the body be weakly, may manage?

To pretend that old age makes a man unfit for every thing, is the ſame as to ſay that a pilot is of no uſe in a veſſel; under pretence, that while ſome aſcend the ſhrouds, others run on the deck, or work at the pump, he ſits at his eaſe at the helm. Indeed, an old man is not capable of doing a number of things which young people do; but he does what is more important, as well, as better. Affairs of

the greateſt importance are not tranſacted by the agility of the body, ſtrength, or ſwiftneſs; but by good advice, authority, and prudence, which age for the moſt part improves, inſtead of loſing. Unleſs, perhaps, you think that I who have acted the part of a ſoldier, a tribune, a lieutenant-general, and a conſul, am now not of any uſe, becauſe I can no longer bear a part in all manner of warlike expeditions. But the ſenate learns of me, how, and in what manner they ſhould carry on the war.

You will find in foreign hiſtories, that the greateſt ſtates have been ruined by young men; but re-eſtabliſhed and ſupported by the old. Thus ſays the poet Nævius, in one of his plays,

Sudden the fall of your once mighty ſtate!
Unfold, I pray, the cauſe of its dire fate?

Amongſt the reaſons which they alledged, the principal one was this;

Its counſellors were men of no repute;
Or unfledg'd ſtriplings, that were fools to boot.

So true it is, that raſhneſs rules us when we are young, and prudence when we grow old.

But memory decays. This may indeed be the caſe, if it was never good, or has been neglected.

However, I have never heard of an old man, that had forgot in what place he concealed his treaſure. Every thing that they are intereſted in they eaſily remember, as obligations entered into, thoſe that are indebted to them, or they to whom they are indebted themſelves.

What ſhall I ſay of augurs, lawyers, prieſts, and philoſophers, who, tho' grown old, yet remember a prodigious number of things? Old people never loſe their abilities, provided they do not diſcontinue their diligence and application: I ſpeak this both of

thoſe who live in a private and undiſturbed retirement, and of men of fame and renown. For inſtance, Sophocles, when he was very old, wrote ſeveral tragedies; and becauſe, for the ſake of his ſtudy, he appeared to neglect his domeſtic affairs, he was ſued at law by his ſons; that, according to our cuſtom of removing ſuch fathers from the management of an eſtate, as are unfit to diſcharge that truſt to advantage, the judges might reſtrain him in the ſame manner, as being turned a dotard. On which the old man is ſaid to have read the tragedy of Oedipus Coloneus to his judges, which chanced to be in his hand, and had been juſt finiſhed: he aſked them, if that could be done by any one that was not in his ſenſes; upon which, they immediately ſtopped the proſecution againſt him.

I COULD mention a number of old country gentlemen in the Sabine territories, who are my friends and neighbours, and our own fellow citizens, that would never permit themſelves to be abſent from their farms, when any thing material was to be done, as ſowing,

reaping, and getting the corn into their barns. But this is not the leaſt amazing in them; for there is no one ſo old, but flatters himſelf that he will ſtill live another year. The greateſt wonder is, that old people will take a great deal of trouble about that which they are certain they will never reap the advantage of.

His trees he plants, the future age to ſerve.

As our countryman Statius has it in his Synephebi. If any perſon ſhould aſk him for whom he plants, he would anſwer, It is for the immortal gods, whoſe pleaſure it is, that I ſhould take advantage of the labour of thoſe who have preceded me, as thoſe that will follow after me will have the advantage of mine.

I NOW no more deſire the ſtrength of a young man, for that is the ſecond objection to old age, than when young, I deſired to be as ſtrong as a bull, or an elephant. A man ought to make a good uſe of and exert him-

ſelf in all his actions, according to the abili-ty he poſſeſſes.

HOWEVER, it oftener happens, that it is the vices of youth, which occaſions old age to want bodily ſtrength, than old age itſelf. For when young people are debauched and intemperate, it quite exhauſts their bodies be-fore they arrive at old age.

SCIPIO, I do not doubt but you have heard, how Maſiniſſa, the dear friend of your an-ceſtors, who is now ninety years of age, ſpends his time: if he ſets out on a journey on foot, he cannot be perſuaded to make uſe of a horſe, and if he ſets out on horſeback, he ne-ver alights: he cannot be prevented from go-ing bare-headed, let it be ever ſo rainy and tempeſtuous; his body is quite ſound and free from humours. In ſhort, he diſcharges all the duties and functions incumbent on a king. Thus we ſee that temperance and exerciſe are capable of preſerving ſome of our former vigour to old age.

I NEVER was fond of that old proverb, which is very common, That if we would live to be old, it is proper that we ſhould begin to be ſo betimes. As for my part, rather than act the part of an old man before I was really ſo, I would chuſe that my old age ſhould be the ſhorter.

WE ought to bear up againſt old age with courage, and redouble our attention for its inconveniencies. We ſhould ſtrive with old age, as with a diſeaſe. The preſervation of health requires our greateſt attention. In order to attain which, we ſhould uſe moderate exerciſe, and take as much meat and drink as is proper to recruit and refreſh, and not to overwhelm our ſtrength. But we ſhould ſtill take greater care of our minds, and rational part, than of our body. For old age will even extinguiſh them, unleſs you feed them, like a lamp, with new oil. As to thoſe whom Cæcilius calls old comic fools, he means ſuch as were credulous, forgetful, and indolent; it is not their age, which renders them ſo,

but is rather owing to ſluggiſhneſs, inactivity, and lazineſs.

As I am fond of a youth that has ſomething of the old man in him, ſo I no leſs approve of an old man, who has ſomething of the youth. Let us but obſerve this rule, and we ſhall never be old in mind, although we may in body.

In the third place, the next objection to old age is, that it is not fond of pleaſures. Fine advantage of age, ſince it removes from us what is moſt dangerous in youth!

Listen, young man, to what Archytas of Tarentum has mentioned on this ſubject, who was one of the greateſt and moſt famous men that ever lived. When a young man at Tarentum with Q. Fabius Maximus, I had it told me. Pleaſure, ſays he, is the moſt terrible ſcourge that nature has beſtowed on mankind; for in order to ſatisfy it, we give a looſe to our moſt inordinate deſires, which carry all before them. Hence ariſe treaſons againſt

our country, the overthrowing of ſtates, and private conferences with the public enemy: in ſhort, the luſt of pleaſure will make people commit the moſt heinous crimes: rapes, adulteries, and ſuch baſe actions, are owing entirely to the inſinuating careſſes of pleaſure. And as reaſon is the richeſt preſent which man has received of nature, or rather of God; yet this divine preſent, this bleſſing of the gods, has not a greater enemy than pleaſure; for where pleaſure rules, there can be no room for temperance; nor where luſt bears ſway, is it poſſible for virtue to have any abode. And in order to comprehend this the better, he bid us repreſent to ourſelves a man as much under the influence of an exquiſite pleaſure, as it is poſſible for the imagination to ſuppoſe: whilſt this tranſport continues, he imagines that there are none but will grant that ſuch a perſon is not capable of doing one ſingle action with reaſon, judgment, or reflection. Nothing therefore is ſo deteſtable, or hurtful, as pleaſure; becauſe the effect it produces while it laſts would quite extinguiſh every intellectual light in the ſoul.

SOPHOCLES was aſked in his old age, if he had any commerce now with women: "God "forbid," ſays he. "No, I have with plea-"ſure made my eſcape from all deſires of this "kind, as from a furious and cruel tyrant."

A FOURTH objection, that fills our advanced ſtate of life full of concern and anxiety, is, the approach of death; this is the principal thing which makes old people ill-humoured. O how are they to be pitied, who, after having lived ſo long, have not learned to deſpiſe death!

WHO is there ſo fooliſh, though in the very flower of his youth, that would promiſe himſelf to live but one ſingle day? And, indeed, young people are much more ſubject to mortal accidents, than old. They fall more eaſily into diſtempers, are ſicker under them, and are with greater difficulty cured. Hence we ſee ſo few live to an old age; which is one reaſon, why mankind live not more prudently and better: for in old men, we gene-

rally find prudence, good ſenſe, and underſtanding.

But an old man cannot hope to live long, whereas a young man may flatter himſelf that he may live a conſiderable time. So fooliſh are the hopes of ſome: for what illuſion is leſs reaſonable, than to reckon upon uncertainties, and hold falſhoods for truths. An old man has no hope, I grant. But his condition in this reſpect is the more advantageous; as having poſſeſſed what the other only hopes to arrive at. The latter wiſhes to live long, the former has already done ſo.

If we live ever ſo ſhort a time, it is ſufficiently long, if we ſpend it agreeable to the dictates of honour and virtue. But if we ſhould live longer, we have no more reaſon to be ſorry on that account, than the huſbandmen have, when the amiable ſpring diſappears, to give place to ſummer and autumn. The ſpring is the image of youth, and expoſes to our view the buds of future fruit; the reaping and in-gathering of which, are deſtin-

ed for the other ſeaſons. Now the remembrance of our many brave and virtuous actions, in the former part of our lives, are, as I have frequently ſaid, the fruit reſerved for old age.

ALL men, it is true, cannot be Scipio's, or Maximus's, to have their memories filled with ſieges of cities taken, with ſea and land engagements, triumphs they had been honoured with, or with wars they had happily finiſhed. But there is not the leaſt fear, but that old age will be calm, and ſerene, provided we ſpend our lives in an eaſy, innocent, and genteel manner. Such was that of Plato, who lived until he was eighty-one years of age, and died with the pen in his hand. Such alſo was that of Iſocrates, who is ſaid, when he was ninety-four years of age, to have wrote the treatiſe called Panathenaicon, and lived five years after that. Leontinus Gorgias, his maſter, lived a hundred and ſeven years; and yet ſtudied to the very laſt. Being aſked, if he was not tired of life: "No," ſays he, "I "have no reaſon to complain of old age." An

anſwer really worthy of a learned man: for it is ſilly fools alone, who give old age the fault of their bad conduct, and vices. Ennius acted otherwiſe, who compares his own old age to that of a victorious race-horſe.

As the brave ſteed, who oft th' olympic prize
has won,
Reſts from the glorious toil, when feeble age
comes on.

X.

On DEATH.

EVERY thing that is appointed by the Gods, or by Nature, the common parent of all things, ought to be eſteemed good and neceſſary. For we were not created by chance, or at random: no, undoubtedly there was ſome powerful being, that paid the utmoſt attention to the intereſts of mortals, and would never have given them exiſtence, or furniſhed them with the means of life, if, after having ſtruggled with the innumerable calamities attending it, they were at laſt to be ſwallowed up by eternal death, the moſt dreadful of all evils. We ought rather to eſteem it a haven, or aſylum prepared for us; and oh that we could fly thither with full ſpread ſails! But if unfavourable winds ſhould

detain us, it is nevertheleſs certain, that we ſhall arrive at it, only ſomewhat later. Why therefore ſhould we reckon that a hardſhip to any one individual, which is the common lot of all?

A PLURALITY of wives being allowed in India, it is cuſtomary, when a huſband dies, for every one of them to appear in a court of juſtice, where it is warmly diſputed, which of them the deceaſed loved moſt affectionately. She that comes off victorious, is eſcorted thence by her relations, and aſcends the funeral pile with the utmoſt gladneſs, to be placed near her departed ſpouſe: but the reſt, on the contrary, who are defeated, return home quite abſorbed in grief. No cuſtom, ſure, could thus brave nature, which continually maintains its ſuperiority.

How abſurd then is it to complain of dying before our time! I would aſk, what time? Is it that of Nature? But ſhe, indeed, has lent us life, as we do a ſum of money, only no certain day is fixed for the payment. Have

we any reaſon then to complain, if ſhe demands it when ſhe thinks proper; ſince we received it on this condition?

SUCH people as theſe think the death of a young boy ought to be born patiently; but there is not even reaſon to complain, if an infant in the cradle happen to die. And yet, in this laſt caſe, nature exacts her loan more rigorouſly than in the other. But the latter, ſay they, had not yet taſted the ſweetneſs of life; whereas the other had entertained very great expectations, and had even begun to enjoy them. It is thought much preferable in other matters to receive a part, rather than none at all; and why not ſo with regard to life? Though Callimachus very juſtly obſerves, *That Troilus wept not near ſo often as Priam.*

WE generally celebrate the good fortune of thoſe who die of old age; and for what reaſon? I really believe, that if the life of old men was protracted longer, it would be the happieſt of all others: for prudence cer-

tainly yields a man more ſatisfaction than any thing elſe; and though old age robs us of other comforts, yet it very ſeldom fails to bring this one along with it.

BUT what age ought we to call long? or is there any thing at all which concerns man that deſerves to be called ſo? How faſt are we hurried on from infancy to youth, and from youth to old age, which, purſuing inviſibly, overtakes us in the midſt of our career, and before we are aware! But we reckon it long, becauſe we have nothing beyond. All theſe ſtages of life, in every individual, are ſaid to be either long or ſhort, only in regard to their ſtated and uſual length. We are informed by Ariſtotle, that on the banks of the river Hypanis, which on the part of Europe falls into the Black Sea, there are found particular inſects, which live no longer than one day. Such of theſe therefore as die at the eighth hour, arrive at a conſiderable age; but thoſe which die at ſunſet, live to be decrepid; and the more ſo, if it happens to be one of the longeſt days in ſummer. Now if

you compare the longeſt life of man with eternity, it will be found to differ very little from the ſhort duration of theſe inſects.

A WISE man is never prevented from conſulting the future welfare of his country and family, and intereſting himſelf for poſterity, of whom he is quite ignorant, by death, which, on account of the numberleſs accidents that conſtantly ſurround us, and conſidering the ſhortneſs of human life, cannot be at a great diſtance. Wherefore ſhould one even believe the ſoul to be mortal, he may mind things of eternal conſequence, and that not from a deſire of glory, whereof he can have no ſenſe; but from a principle of virtue, which is neceſſarily attended by real glory, notwithſtanding he ſhould have no ſuch view.

AT the hour of death, we ought certainly to be very reſigned, when we can ſolace our dying minutes with reflexions of ſelf-approbation. He who has fully diſcharged the duties of an exalted virtue, has not lived too ſhort a time.

If we know but a little of natural philoſophy, we cannot entertain a doubt, that the ſoul is perfectly ſimple, free from all mixture, and in no degree compounded, joined, or made up of different parts. Since this then is the caſe, ſurely it can neither be ſeparated nor divided, and of courſe muſt be immortal. For death is, as it were, the ſeparation, diviſion, and diſunion of thoſe parts, which were once united.

Such reaſons as theſe induced Socrates neither to deſire an advocate to plead his cauſe, nor to turn ſupplicant to his judges: but he ſhewed a free and generous boldneſs, that proceeded from true magnanimity, and not from pride. He diſcourſed a long time upon this very ſubject on the day of his death. He would not ſuffer himſelf to be reſcued from priſon before this happened, though it might have been effected with the utmoſt facility. Nay, juſt before he took the deadly draught, he talked in ſuch a manner, as if he was not going to ſuffer a violent death, but to be carried up to Heaven.

THERE are two different ways, ſaid he, and two oppoſite courſes, which ſouls take at the diſſolution of the body. They follow a by-path, quite oppoſite to that which leads to the heavenly manſions, who have polluted themſelves with the common vices of mankind, devoted their whole powers to the gratification of their luſts, and ſtained their characters with private crimes, or been guilty of irreparable injuſtice againſt the ſtate. But they, on the other hand, who have preſerved their innocence and purity entire, kept themſelves as free as poſſible from the contagion of bodies, acted always as diſtinct from them, and though united to human bodies, have imitated the life of the Gods, eaſily return to the celeſtial beings, from whom they came.

I AM quite of a different opinion from thoſe, who not long ſince attempted to prove, that when the body dies the ſoul alſo fares the ſame fate; I am more ſwayed by the authority of the antients, and of our own anceſters, who have ordained ſacred rights to be performed for the dead; which trouble

they certainly would have ſaved themſelves, had they imagined that the dead were not concerned in them. I alſo agree with thoſe who formerly taught their doctrines in that part of our own country called the Greater Greece, which, though now in ruins, was at that time a flouriſhing ſtate: and with that Athenian whom the oracle of Apollo declared to be the wiſeſt of men. However undetermined he might be in other matters, yet he always aſſerted, that our ſouls are of a divine nature; and that, on quitting the body, they return to heaven, and have a paſſage thither, ſo much the more expeditious as they themſelves have led virtuous lives.

It is a ſaying of Socrates, that *the whole life of philoſophers is a conſtant meditation on death.* For what elſe do we, when we call off our attention from ſenſual pleaſure, and all domeſtic concerns, thoſe ſervants of the body; when we detach our minds from public buſineſs, and all kinds of embarraſſment? What is this, I ſay, but to call the ſoul home, to make it keep company with itſelf, and

draw it from the body as much as poſſible? Now abſtracting the ſoul from the body is no more than learning to die.

IT is my real opinion, therefore, that we ought ſeriouſly to conſider this, that by diſuniting ourſelves from our bodies, we may make death familiar to us. By which means we ſhall lead a heavenly life, even before our diſſolution; and the flight of the ſoul will be more ſpeedy, when freed from theſe fetters.

WHETHER is it better to live or die? The Gods alone can tell: for all the knowledge of mortals in this affair is but trifling.

XI.

SCIPIO's DREAM.

WHEN I arrived in Africa, whither you know the conſul M. Manilius ſent me, to command the fourth legion, my firſt buſineſs was to wait upon king Maſiniſſa; who, for very good reaſons, had the ſtricteſt friendſhip for our family.

As ſoon as the worthy old man ſaw me, he embraced me ſo tenderly, that it drew tears from his eyes; and pauſing a moment, having raiſed his eyes to heaven, Sovereign Sun, ſays he, and all ye other celeſtial beings, I return you my moſt hearty thanks, for thus ſending into my own kingdom, and under this roof, before I die, P. Cornelius Scipio, whoſe name alone inſpires me with freſh vi-

gour; ſo deeply is the memory of that excellent and moſt invincible of men rooted in my mind!

THEN I enquired of him concerning the affairs of his kingdom; and he, on his part, queſtioned me about the ſtate of our republic; in which kind of converſation we ſpent the remainder of the day. Towards evening, being entertained in a manner worthy the magnificence of a king, we continued our converſation till it was very late: all which time the worthy old man ſpoke of nothing but Africanus, whoſe actions, and even remarkable ſayings, were yet freſh in his mind. However, when we retired to bed, I fell into a ſounder ſleep than uſual, undoubtedly occaſioned by my journey, and by ſitting up a great part of the night.

HERE I had the following dream, which I really imagine was occaſioned by the converſation we had had together; for it frequently happens, that the thoughts and diſcourſe which employ us in the day time, pro-

duce in our ſleep a ſimilar effect to that which Ennius informs us happened to him about Homer; of whom he often thought and ſpoke when awake. Methought Africanus appeared to me in a ſhape, with which I was better acquainted from his picture, than any perſonal knowledge of him. When I knew it was he, I own I was very much afraid: but he thus addreſſed me; Be not afraid, my Scipio, take courage, and forget not what I ſhall ſay to you.

Do you ſee that city (pointing to Carthage from a bright and glorious place of the ſky, that was all ſtudded with ſtars) which, though brought under the Roman yoke by me, is now renewing the former wars, and cannot live in peace? This very day you are come to attack it, in a ſtation not much ſuperior to that of a private ſoldier. You ſhall be conſul, however, before two years paſs away, and ſhall compleat its overthrow; whence you ſhall obtain, by your own merit, the ſurname of Africanus, which you at preſent poſſeſs only as derived from me.

WHEN Carthage is deſtroyed, you ſhall be honoured with a triumph, be advanced to the cenſorſhip, and viſit Egypt, Syria, Aſia, and Greece, in quality of legate: during your abſence, you ſhall be a ſecond time elected conſul; and by utterly deſtroying Eumantia, terminate a dreadful war.

BUT on entering the capitol in your triumphant car, you ſhall find the republic all in a ferment, occaſioned by the intrigues of my grandſon. You muſt ſhew your country the greatneſs of your underſtanding, capacity, and prudence, my dear Africanus, on this occaſion.

THE deſtiny, however, of that time, appears uncertain, as it were, which way it ſhall take: for when your age ſhall have accompliſhed eight times ſeven revolutions of the ſun [fifty-ſix years], and your fatal hours ſhall be marked out by the natural product of theſe two numbers, each whereof is eſteemed a perfect one, but for different reaſons; then you ſhall be the only hope of

Rome; on the ſenate, all good citizens, the allies, and people of Latium, ſhall caſt their eyes; on you the preſervation of the ſtate ſhall wholly depend; in ſhort, you muſt, in quality of dictator, eſtabliſh peace and order in the republic, if you eſcape the wicked plots laid againſt you by your relations.

HERE Lælius wept bitterly, and the reſt of the company gave vent to their ſorrow by deep groans; upon which Scipio ſmiling, ſaid, I beg, gentlemen, that you would not wake me out of my dream; be ſilent, and hear the remainder.

THAT you may be encouraged, my dear Africanus, chearfully to defend the ſtate, know, that there is a place in heaven for all thoſe who have in any manner conduced to the preſervation, defence, or enlargement of their native country; in which they ſhall enjoy never-ending happineſs: for God, the ſupreme governor of the univerſe, is not more pleaſed with any thing than the ſocieties and aſſemblies of men joined together by

laws. It is from heaven that thoſe who govern them came, and thither they will return.

THOUGH theſe words gave me a great deal of uneaſineſs, not ſo much on account of the apprehenſion of death, as at the idea of this perfidy with which I was threatened; yet I recollected myſelf enough to aſk if it was true, that my father Paulus, and others whom we thought dead, were really living?

UNDOUBTEDLY, anſwered he, they alone enjoy life, who have eſcaped from the body, as from a priſon; but as to what we give the appellation of life, it is no more than a ſtate of death. Behold your father Paulus advancing towards you.

WHEN I ſaw him, tears guſhed from my eyes: but he embracing me, deſired me not to weep. As ſoon as my firſt tranſports ſubſided, and I had regained the liberty of ſpeech, I thus addreſſed my father: Thou moſt worthy and venerable of parents, ſince Africanus informs me that this is the only

ſubſtantial life, why do I linger on earth, and not rather haſte to join you in theſe bleſſed regions?

THAT is impoſſible, replied he; for unleſs the God, whoſe temple is all that vaſt expanſe you behold, ſhall ſet you at liberty from the fetters of the body, you cannot be admitted into this place. Men have received their being on this very condition, that they ſhall labour for the preſervation of that globe, which you ſee is ſituated in the middle of this temple, and is called earth. They have alſo a ſoul, which is a portion of the eternal fires, by you called ſtars and conſtellations; and theſe being round ſpherical bodies, animated by divine intelligences, perform their revolutions with ſurpriſing velocity. You therefore, my ſon, and all who reverence the Gods, ought to preſerve the union of your ſoul and body; nor without the expreſs command of him who gave you a ſoul, ſhould the leaſt thought be entertained of quitting human life, leſt you ſeem to deſert the poſt aſſigned you by God himſelf. Keep the

examples of your grandfather here, and of me your father, conſtantly in view, and pay a ſtrict regard to juſtice and piety; the influence of which towards parents and relations is great indeed, but to our country greateſt of all. By following ſuch a life as this, you will at laſt arrive at heaven, and enjoy the company of thoſe, who after having lived on earth, and been diſunited from the body, inhabit the place you at preſent ſee.

WHAT he meant was that ſhining circle or zone, which is diſtinguiſhed among the conſtellations by its amazing brightneſs; and which is by you named the Milky Orb, after the Greeks.

FROM which, as I took a view of the univerſe, every thing appeared beautiful and admirable: for I ſaw there not only thoſe ſtars that are inviſible from this globe; but all of them of ſuch magnitude as we could not have imagined. That ſtar which is removed fartheſt from the heavens, and is ſituated neareſt the earth, ſhining with a borrow-

ed light, appeared the leaſt of all. Now the globes of the ſtars were far larger than our earth; which at that diſtance appeared ſo minute, that I was very much affected when I ſaw our whole empire no larger, than if we in a manner only touched the earth in a ſingle point.

My attention being ſtill taken up with looking at the earth, How long, pray, ſays Africanus, will your mind be fixed on that object? You ought rather to examine the ſuperb temples at which you are arrived. The univerſe is compoſed of nine circles, or rather ſpheres, the uppermoſt of which is this celeſtial one, comprehending all the reſt, and is the reſidence of the Almighty God, who bounds and contains them all. In it thoſe ſtars are fixed, that revolve with unalterable courſes. Below this are ſeven other ſpheres, moving backwards, or with a contrary motion to that of the heavens: one of theſe is taken up by the globe, and is called Saturn by you mortals. Next to that is the ſtar of Jupiter, ſo benign and ſalutary to

mankind. Then comes Mars, that terrible and fiery planet. Below this again, almoſt in the middle region, is the ſun, that leader, governor, and chief of the other luminaries, that mind and temperament of the univerſe, which is of ſo prodigious a ſize, that all things are filled and enlightened with his rays. Then follow Venus and Mercury, who are, as it were, attendants on the ſun. Laſtly, the moon, which ſhines only by the reflected rays of the ſun, moves in the loweſt ſphere of all: below which, all things are mortal, and tend to diſſolution, except human ſouls, that preſent made us by the Gods; but every thing above it is eternal. For the earth, which is the ninth globe, and occupies the center, is immoveable, and to it all heavy bodies naturally tend, as being the loweſt place in the univerſe.

I WAS thunderſtruck at ſo ſurpriſing a proſpect: but when I recovered myſelf a little, I thus ſaid to Africanus; Pray what is this ſound that I hear, which is ſo loud and agreeable? He replied, It is that produced

by the impulſe and motion of the ſpheres; and being formed by unequal intervals, (but ſuch, however, as are divided according to the juſteſt proportion) it produces, by duly tempering ſharp with flat ſounds, various concerts of muſic. For motions ſo great cannot be performed without a prodigious noiſe; and it is agreeable to nature, that the extremes on the one ſide ſhould produce acute, and on the other grave, ſounds. For which reaſon the ſphere of the fixed ſtars being higheſt, and carried with a more rapid velocity, moves with a ſhrill and acute ſound: whereas that of the moon being loweſt, moves with a very flat one. As to the earth, which makes a ninth ſphere, it remains immoveably fixed in the middle or loweſt part of the univerſe. Now the revolutions of theſe eight orbs, every two of which have the ſame force, give ſeven diſtinct ſounds; which number is the meaſure of almoſt every thing in the world.

SEVERAL celebrated muſicians have imitated this celeſtial harmony, both on inſtru-

ments and with the voice; whereby they have opened themſelves a way to return hither: as have alſo many others, who, while living, employed their ſublime genius in cultivating the divine ſciences.

MANKIND have been rendered deaf by this great noiſe; for of all the human ſenſes, hearing is the dulleſt. Thus the inhabitants of thoſe places near the cataracts of the Nile are deprived of the ſenſe of hearing, by the prodigious noiſe which that river makes in falling from thoſe lofty mountains. In like manner, the ſound occaſioned by the rapid motion of the whole world is ſo inconceivably great, that the ear can no more receive it, than the eye can look ſteadfaſtly at the ſun, by whoſe beams the ſtrongeſt ſight is eaſily dazzled.

I FREQUENTLY caſt my eyes upon the earth, while I was buſied in admiring this ſcene of wonders. Africanus perceiving this, ſaid, I ſee you are ſtill taken up in contemplating the ſeat and reſidence of mankind:

now if it appears to you ſo ſmall as in fact it really is, deſpiſe its vanities, and fix your attention for ever on theſe heavenly objects. Is it poſſible you ſhould attain any human applauſe, or glory, that is worth the contending for? You may obſerve, that the earth is but peopled in a very few places, and thoſe too of ſmall extent; ſo that they appear like ſo many ſpots, as it were, ſcattered through large uncultivated deſarts: its inhabitants are not only ſo far diſtant from each other, as to cut off all mutual correſpondence; but their ſituation being either oblique, on contrary parts of the globe, or perhaps diametrically oppoſite to yours, all expectations of fame muſt fall to the ground. The ſame globe of the earth, you may alſo ſee, is in a manner girt and environed with certain zones; whereof thoſe two which are moſt remote from each other, and lie under the oppoſite poles of heaven, are congealed with froſt; but that one in the middle, which far ſurpaſſes the others in largeneſs, is ſcorched with the ſun's exceſſive heat. The other two are habitable: one towards the ſouth, the inhabitants of

which are your Antipodes, with whom you have no connection: the other towards the north, is that inhabited by you, of which you ſee a very ſmall part falls to your ſhare. For the whole extent of your poſſeſſions is no more than a ſmall iſland, narrow at both ends, and wide towards the middle, which is environed by the ſea, by mortals called the Atlantic, the Great Sea, and the Ocean. You cannot avoid remarking its minuteneſs, notwithſtanding its great titles. Now I would aſk if it be poſſible for your fame, or that of any other Roman, to reach from theſe known countries, over mountain Caucaſus yonder, or croſs the Ganges? Will your name ever be ſo much as mentioned in the remoteſt parts of the eaſt and weſt, or thoſe of the north and ſouth? And if theſe are not reckoned, you may perceive how ſhort a way your ambition can exert itſelf.

Now as to thoſe very perſons who ſhall ſpeak of you, how long, pray, will they do it? Beſides, allowing that the ſucceeding generations of men wiſhed to tranſmit down to poſterity the noble things they have been told of

by their fathers concerning us; yet on account of inundations and conflagrations, which according to the courſe of nature muſt happen at certain times, our renown cannot be of any conſiderable, much leſs of an eternal, duration.

MOREOVER, what avails it, to be praiſed by thoſe who come after you; when your predeceſſors, who were perhaps as numerous, and certainly ſuperior in merit, knew not even your name?

BESIDES, not one of thoſe who ſhall hear of us, can remember the tranſactions even of one year. The generality of mankind, indeed, meaſure their year by the return of the ſun, which is no more than one ſtar; but the real and compleat year is when all the ſtars ſhall have returned to the place from whence they ſet out, and after long periods ſhall have again exhibited the ſame aſpect of the whole heavens: and, indeed, I am almoſt afraid to attempt to enumerate the prodigious number of ages contained in it. For as the ſun was

eclipſed, and ſeemed to be extinguiſhed, at the time when Romulus's ſoul entered theſe heavenly manſions; ſo when all the conſtellations and ſtars ſhall revert to their primary poſition, and the ſun ſhall at the ſame point and time be again eclipſed, the grand year ſhall then be compleated. Know, however, that the twentieth part of it is not yet elapſed.

WERE it not in expectation of returning to this place, where great and worthy men enjoy every thing they can deſire; what would all earthly glory ſignify, which very rarely is of longer duration than the ſpace of one year?

PAY no attention to the diſcourſe of the vulgar, nor put any confidence in human rewards; if you are deſirous of entertaining exalted expectations, and keeping in view this everlaſting abode, follow the ſteps of virtue alone, whoſe charms will allure you to real honour. What others ſhall talk of you, for talk they will, is their concern. However, all this kind of diſcourſe is confined

within the narrow bounds of the countries you now ſee; with reſpect to every man, they preſently drop off, and poſterity remember them no more.

HAVING heard this, I addreſſed Africanus in theſe words. Though my father's and your illuſtrious examples have been cloſely followed by me from my infancy; yet ſince all thoſe who have deſerved well of their country are freely admitted into heaven, I ſhall redouble my efforts, as I have the proſpect of being ſo well rewarded.

Do ſo, replied he, for I aſſure you, that your body is the only part of you that is mortal. For your being is not conſtituted of that external form, or figure, that falls under the notice of our ſenſes; it is the ſoul, and not the body, that makes the real man. Know then that you are a God, if he can be ſaid to poſſeſs divinity, who has life, intelligence, memory, and foreſight in himſelf; and who rules, governs, and moves the body al-

lotted him, as the all powerful God does the univerſe, which is partly mortal; for the immortal ſoul gives motion to the body, which alſo periſhes.

A BEING which is conſtantly in motion, is eternal; but that which communicates motion to another, and is itſelf impelled by ſome external agent, muſt of courſe ceaſe to live, when it loſes its motion. That therefore alone, which moves itſelf, can never ceaſe to move, becauſe it is never deſerted by itſelf. Beſides, ſuch a motion muſt be the ſource and principle of all others whatever.

A PRINCIPLE has no origin. For from it every thing is derived; yet is itſelf derived from nothing, otherwiſe it would be no principle. And if it has no beginning, it of courſe muſt have no end; becauſe being once extinct, it could neither be re-produced by another, nor of itſelf give birth to any thing, ſince all things muſt neceſſarily ſpring from ſome principle.

THE principle of motion is therefore in that Being, which moves by an intrinſic power of its own, and can neither have a beginning nor end; otherwiſe the whole heavens would go to deſtruction, and all nature be at a ſtand, without a poſſibility of recovering any power, by which ſhe might be ſet in motion, as at the beginning.

IT being evident, that whatever moves of itſelf is eternal, can any one deny that the human ſoul is endowed with this power? for that being which external impulſe ſets in motion is inanimate, or without a ſoul. But an animated being is moved by a proper intrinſic motion of its own; and this power is natural and peculiar to the ſoul. Then, ſince it alone, of all other beings, moves itſelf, we may naturally conclude that it never had a beginning, and that it will never have an end.

WE ought then fully to employ it in the moſt important affairs; and ſuch are all efforts in our country's defence. The flight of the ſoul that exerciſes and exerts itſelf in

actions of this kind, will be the more ſpeedy to theſe celeſtial manſions, its real habitation.

If it free and abſtract itſelf as much as poſſible from the body, even while it inhabits its earthly dwelling, in order to contemplate heavenly objects, it will ſtill fly with greater ſwiftneſs.

Those people's ſouls are continually toſſed about the earth, who have devoted themſelves to, and become the ſlaves of ſenſual pleaſures; and by blindly following the impulſe of ſuch paſſions as are ſubſervient to ſenſuality, have violated all laws divine and human; nor do they return to this place, till after they have been thus tormented for ſeveral ages.

Thus ſaying, he left me, and I awoke.

XII.

MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS.

HAD we been formed in ſuch a manner, as to have been able to comprehend and diſcover nature, and to rule the whole affairs of our life under her excellent conduct, there would have been no occaſion for reaſon and inſtruction. But, in reality, ſhe has only given us ſome glimmering ſparks, which ſoon come to be ſo very obſcure, through our corruption of manners, and falſe ideas, that the light of nature no where appears. It is true, indeed, that the ſeeds of virtue are blended with our very conſtitution; and were they allowed to increaſe and grow up to maturity, nature would not fail to make life happy. But as the caſe now is, we come no ſooner into the world, than we are always en-

gaged in every kind of wickedneſs, and have the moſt abſurd notions that can be ſuppoſed; ſo that we may be ſaid to ſuck in error with our nurſe's milk. We receive ſuch a number of bad impreſſion when we are brought home to our parents, and put under the care of preceptors, that the force of prejudice yields to nature, and falſhood bears ſway over truth. Add to theſe the poets; who carrying a great ſhew of wiſdom and learning, are hearkened to, ſtudied, read, and, as it were, imprinted on our minds. Now if we join the populace to this, which though a multitude always concur in every thing that is not right, are nevertheleſs the greateſt of all other directors of opinion; when, I ſay, that this is added to the account, we ought not to be amazed if we abſolutely loſe ſight of nature, and are quite bewildered in the moſt deſtructive errors.

THE great ſhould be a model for the public; if it was ſo every thing would go well; for as the licentious paſſions and vices of great men infect a whole city; ſo likewiſe their

moderation reforms it. L. Lucullus, a man of fortune, being reproached for having ſo magnificent a ſeat at Tuſculum, is ſaid to have made the following very proper anſwer; that he had but two neighbours, the greateſt of whom was only a Roman knight, and the other the ſon of one who had been once a ſlave: and as they had both elegant houſes, what was not unlawful for them who were his inferiors, could not be thought extravagant in him. Ah! Lucullus, you do not ſee, that it was you who gave riſe to their ambition; if your example had not authorized them, they would have been thought guilty of a crime. Who can patiently ſee theſe ſort of people have their country-houſes full of ſtatues and pictures, either relating to public, or what is more, to ſacred and religious ſubjects? Who would not aſſiſt in deſtroying the monuments of their pride and vanity, if thoſe who ought to exert themſelves on ſuch an occaſion, were not guilty of the ſame error themſelves? For the evil that neceſſarily attends the vices of the great, though we muſt grant it to be very conſiderable, yet it is but

trifling when compared with the bad conſequences that will ariſe from the great number of imitators they will certainly have.

SEARCH but into the hiſtory of paſt ages, and you will find, that the people's manners were always regulated by thoſe of the leading men of the ſtate; and whenever there was any change in the manners of the great, the people always conformed to it. Now this is a much more certain obſervation than that of Plato, who pretends that a new kind of muſick is capable of changing the manners of a nation: whereas I am of opinion, that the people's manners change with thoſe of their ſuperiors. Thus thoſe great men who lead a vicious life are doubly hurtful to the ſtate, as they are not only guilty of vices themſelves, but they communicate them to their fellow citizens: they are not only corrupted themſelves, but they corrupt others. In ſhort, the example which they give is worſe than the evil which they commit.

PLATO, that prince of genius and learn-

ing, ſaid, that in his opinion the people would never be happy, till learned and wiſe men were choſen to govern them; or till wiſdom and knowledge ſhould be the ſole ſtudy of thoſe who did govern them. That, in ſhort, to promote the public welfare, it was neceſſary that wiſdom and power ſhould be joined together.

SOCRATES being aſked, if Archelaus, the ſon of Perdiccas, who then paſſed for the happieſt man alive, was really ſo; "I do not "know," ſays he, "for I am not acquainted "with him." What? is there no other rule that we may judge by? "None at all." Cannot you then poſitively ſay whether the great king of Perſia himſelf be happy? "How can "I," ſays he, "when I do not know whether "he is virtuous and learned?" Do you pretend that it is this then which conſtitutes felicity? "Yes certainly, I think, that the good "are happy, and the wicked wretched." Is Archelaus then unhappy? "If he be unjuſt, "certainly he is."

SINCE nature then is content with a little, what end does a table that is ſerved ſumptuouſly and with profuſion ſerve? for every one knows that a good appetite gives the beſt reliſh to every thiug of this kind. Darius, in his flight, being reduced to drink water that was both muddy, and likewiſe infected with dead bodies, ſaid, that he had never before drank with ſo much pleaſure: for this very reaſon, becauſe he had never done ſo, when thirſty. Nor did Ptolemy ever know what hunger was, until he was travelling through Egypt without his ordinary attendants about him, when happening to go into a cottage, he could get no better entertainment than plain houſhold bread; which appeared to him to be the moſt delightful morſel that ever he taſted in his life.

A NUMBER of difficulties attend every branch of knowledge; the things are ſo obſcure of themſelves, and the uncertainty of our determinations concerning them ſo great, that it was not without reaſon, that the moſt learned men of antiquity had little expecta-

tions to find out the great object of their research; yet they continued their enquiries, and we will with courage continue ours. Now the only motive which engages us to argue both for and againſt the queſtion, is, to force, as it were, a diſcovery of the truth, or ſomething very near it: nor is there any difference between thoſe who pretend they poſſeſs the knowledge of things, unleſs it be, that they think they are abſolutely certain of their opinions: whereas we hold many things to be only probable; which may very well ſerve us for rules, but we cannot be quite poſitive that they are certain.

HOWEVER, as we are always maſters of our judgment, we preſerve a perfect liberty, and are under no obligation to maintain our ſentiments which have been preſcribed to us, and are in a manner commanded.

As for others, they fix themſelves to one ſide, before they are able to diſcern which is the right; and either take up with the opinion of a friend, in an age capable of nothing,

or charmed with the diſcourſe of the firſt maſter they hear, they judge of what they cannot conceive; and embrace a ſect by chance, as we do in a tempeſt the firſt rock which the winds and waves throw us upon.

Some indeed reply, that they confide in none but whom they think very wiſe; and I would commend this conduct of theirs, were it poſſible for people deſtitute of all learning and knowledge, to form ſuch a judgment: for it is certainly the chief characteriſtic of a wiſe man, to be able to judge who are ſo. But in order to this, they ſhould not only examine every circumſtance, but alſo know the judgment of others: whereas they have given their opinion on a ſingle hearing, and ſheltered themſelves under the authority of one man. But the moſt of people, I know not how, are fond of being deceived, and rather defend the opinion they have once embraced with vigour, than with candour and impartiality examine what ſentiments are moſt agreeable to truth.

THE laws are above magiſtrates, the ſame as the magiſtrates are above the people: and we may with truth ſay, that the magiſtrate is a ſpeaking law, and the law a dumb magiſtrate.

THREE things are demanded of a good ſenator: that he be always preſent; for when an aſſembly is numerous, it gives weight to their determinations: that he ſpeak in his turn, that is, when he is ſpoke to: that he preſcribe bounds to his diſcourſe; for brevity is a great merit not only in a ſenator, but likewiſe in an orator.

THE more virtuous any man is, the more difficult it is for him to ſuſpect others that are not ſo.

IT is ſurely a great ſuperiority of nature and underſtanding, that, of all the animal world, man alone has any judgment of order, decency, and a rule neceſſary to be obſerved both in his actions and diſcourſe. Hence with reſpect to the objects of ſight, he

is the only animal who can judge of their beauty, gracefulneſs, and ſymmetry of parts; and theſe very ideas with which his eyes are ſtruck, being by reaſon applied to the operation of the ſoul, he perceives that beauty, rule, and order, ſhould much more take place in our actions and projects: he is alſo attentive never to forget decency: alſo, that his ſentiments, as well as his outward behaviour, be free from the influence of all irregular paſſion.

Sp. Carvilius being wounded in battle, was ſo lame, that he was aſhamed to appear in public: "Appear abroad," ſaid his mother to him, "that each ſtep you make, my dear "ſon, may remind you of your virtues."

Cato has left it on record, that the elder Scipio, whoſe ſurname was Africanus, uſed to ſay, "I am never leſs at leiſure, than "when at leiſure; nor leſs alone, than when "alone."

This fine ſaying, ſo worthy of a great and

wiſe man, plainly ſhews that he ſpent the uſual times of relaxation in ſome valuable projects; and uſed to converſe with himſelf when retired; ſo that he never wanted employment in his ſolitude; two things which make other men idle, gave him freſh activity and life.

I NEVER reckoned among the things that are really good in themſelves, treaſures, palaces, places of dignity and power, nor the pleaſures of ſenſe, to which ſome people are entirely enſlaved. I have always ſeen, that they who had the greateſt ſhare of them, are by far the more covetous for more: for it is impoſſible to quench or ſatisfy the thirſt of avarice; nor are theſe ſort of people only tormented with the pain of obtaining their wealth, but likewiſe of loſing it. Though our anceſtors were, in this reſpect, men of the greateſt temperance, yet I am often at a loſs to account for their prudence, in giving the name of Goods to frivolous and periſhable riches; when, in reality, their conduct makes it appear, that they judged quite otherwiſe.

Can a bad man poſſeſs any thing that is good? Or can any one have a great abundance of things that are really good, and not be good himſelf? And yet we ſee all ſuch pretended goods divided amongſt wicked men, to the ruin of the virtuous. Any one therefore that chuſes may banter me, I will always pay a proper reſpect rather to the dictates of right reaſon, than to vulgar prejudices: I ſhall never ſay that any one has loſt his goods, when he has loſt his cattle or his furniture; and I ſhall often repeat with praiſe the anſwer of Bias, one of the ſeven wiſe men, who, when the enemy had taken his native country Priene, and the conquered were carrying away a good deal of their effects, he being adviſed to do the ſame, replied, "I carry about me e-"very thing that is mine." He looked on whatever was the ſport of fortune, as not in any way to belong to him; and yet we call them goods. Some will ſay, what will then merit this name? I anſwer, nothing is good but what is agreeable to virtue, honour, and juſtice.

In the firſt place, we ſhould ſee in what ſtation, and what character, we are to appear in the world. Nothing is more difficult, than to fix this point: for when we are young, our judgment not being formed, we are not capable of judging properly, every one making his choice as he may be directed by fancy; ſo that he is really engaged in ſome particular courſe of life, before he is capable to judge which is beſt. Xenophon indeed relates, that Herculus of Prodicus being arrived at manhood, a time when every one chooſes what courſe of life he ſhall lead, retired into a deſart, where two ways preſenting themſelves to him, one of which lead to pleaſure, and the other to virtue, he was a long time at a loſs to which to give the preference. This probably might do very well for Hercules, the ſon of Jupiter, but not for us, who for the moſt part imitate ſuch perſons as ſuit our ſeveral taſtes, to whoſe ſtudies and way of life we generally attach ourſelves.

In order therefore to determine our way of living, we ſhould, in the firſt place, con-

ſult our natural diſpoſition, and next, the ſituation of our fortune, but principally our natural genius, as being more certain, and leſs capable of changing.

PHILIP, king of Macedon, was not ſo great a conqueror as his ſon; but he was far ſuperior in goodneſs and humanity. Hence the one was always great, and the other, often to the higheſt degree brutal. So that it is an excellent advice, that the higher our ſituation is, the more modeſt and ſubmiſſive we ſhould be.

WE ſhould pay a proper reſpect to all men, not only the virtuous, but the public in general: for to deſpiſe what every one thinks of us, is the ſure characteriſtic of one void of probity and honour.

XERXES, upon whom fortune had laviſhed all her favours, not content with being maſter of powerful armies, numerous fleets, and inexhauſtible treaſures, propoſed a reward to any one who could find a new pleaſure. Nor

did even that ſatisfy him, for the thirſt of pleaſure is inſatiable. As for me, I could wiſh, that in propoſing a reward, we could alſo excite ſome one to diſcover a new reaſon, which would more ſtrongly convince us, that, in order to live happily, it is neceſſary to be virtuous.

PRAY, what end does this fooliſh vanity ſignify in relating how rich you are? Are there none rich in the world but you? O heavens! what do I hear? Shall not every addition to my knowledge pleaſe me? Are you then alone rich? But what if you are not ſo? If you are even poor? For whom, I would aſk, do we call rich; or, to whom properly belongs this epithet? I imagine it is ſome one, who has ſufficient to make him live genteelly; and being contented with this, neither deſires nor wiſhes for any more. It is not your immenſe revenues, or what people can ſay of you, but your mind, that can decide whether you are opulent or not. Does what you have content you; having every thing your heart can wiſh for; and even an

abundant ſupply of caſh? Then I grant, that you are a rich man. But, on the contrary, if you have ſuch an inſatiable deſire, as to think all ſorts of gain honourable; whereas every kind of it, in a perſon of your rank, muſt be ſo: if you are conſtantly guilty of fraud, theft, robbery, deceit, exaction, diſhoneſt bargains: if you rob the allies and public treaſury: if you imagine that the wills of your friends will be favourable for you; and not only ſo, but even forge them yourſelf. Are theſe, I pray, the ſigns of opulence, or indigence? It is the mind, and not the coffer of a man that can be called rich. Though the latter ſhould be ever ſo full; yet, I ſhould never think you a rich man, if you are empty yourſelf. We meaſure wealth by the wants of mankind. Have you a daughter? Then certainly you want money. Have you two? You have occaſion for a larger ſum? Have you a number of them? Then ſtill more. And if you have fifty of them, as Danaüs is ſaid to have had, a great eſtate would be neceſſary to give fortunes to ſo many. For, as I have already mentioned, every

man's neceſſity regulates the ſtandard of riches. Can he therefore be eſteemed a rich man, who, inſtead of having a number of daughters, has many whims, and is capable of ſpending the greateſt eſtates? No, he feels his poverty too much himſelf.

LET us therefore ſpeak with mildneſs, which diſtinguiſhes the diſciples of Socrates, and be void of obſtinacy; let our diſcourſe be graceful, and full of ſpirit; and by no means deprive others of their ſhare, as if it conſtituted part of our property: but let every one have his turn in converſation, as in other ſocial matters. The firſt thing to be conſidered, is the ſubject to be ſpoke to: it ſhould be handled with gravity, if it be ſerious, and with wit and pleaſantry, if of a merry and gay turn; but we ſhould eſpecially take care, not to give the world a bad opinion of us. This laſt moſtly happens, when the abſent are ridiculed, or defamed on purpoſe, or their character handled with ill-nature, contempt, and ſeverity. Our converſation, for the moſt part, is about private and domeſtic concerns,

the affairs of the public, or ſome point of learning. If therefore the diſcourſe ſhould chance to change from theſe to ſomething elſe, we ſhould do all we could to bring it back: but whatever turn the converſation ſhall take, (for all the world are not fond of the ſame things, ſince what pleaſes a great deal in one time, will not pleaſe in another) we ſhould above all things be attentive, how far we may perſiſt in it with pleaſure; and as reaſon ſhould teach us when to ſpeak, ſo moderation ſhould direct us when to leave off.

THEMISTOCLES being aſked, if two men were about his daughter, the one of whom being poor, but of known probity, the other rich, but of an equivocal diſpoſition, which would he give the preference to: "I would rather "chooſe," ſays he, "a man without money, "than money without a man."

THE ſhorteſt way to arrive at glory, ſays the admirable Socrates, is to apply ourſelves to be really what we appear to be. They are deceived, who flatter themſelves that they

merit the eſteem of men by mere oſtentation, by a maſque of virtue, a ſtudied ſpeech, or a formal look. Fiction, like the bloſſom of trees, ſoon falls to the ground, it being impoſſible for any thing of that nature to be durable: whereas real glory takes deep root, and produces fruit.

PHILIP, in writing to his ſon Alexander, takes this admirable way to reprove him, for ſtriving to win the affections of the Macedonians by preſents. "How can you imagine," ſays he, "that thoſe people whom you have "corrupted by bribery, will be faithful to "you? Is it your deſign that the Macedo-"nians ſhould reckon you as their treaſurer "and ſteward, and not as their king?"

THOUGH the laws of the twelve tables have made a very trifling number of offences puniſhable by death; yet they thought proper to place the following one in that number, viz. "if any one ſung, or compoſed ver-"ſes that are injurious or defamatory:" And this was a very wiſe rule; for it is to courts

of juſtice, and the magiſtrates, that we are anſwerable for our conduct, and not to the whims of poets: nor is it proper that we ſhould hear ourſelves defamed, unleſs before a tribunal, where we are at liberty to defend ourſelves?

It is very unhappy to conceive criminal projects, nor is it ſo great a misfortune, not to obtain our wiſhes, as to wiſh to obtain what is improper.

A dispute happening between Themiſtocles and a man of the iſland Seriphos, who had reproached him, that he owed his reputation to the glory of his own country, and not to his own virtues; "I confeſs," ſays Themiſtocles, "if I was a native of Seriphos, "I ſhould not be illuſtrious, but you, if an A-"thenian, would never be noble."

Dionysius having begun to exerciſe a tyrannic power over the beautiful and flouriſhing city of Syracuſe at the age of twenty-five, continued his oppreſſive government for

thirty-eight years. Now authors of good credit relate of him, that with reſpect to diet he was a man of the greateſt temperance, and active and bold in managing buſineſs; but withal naturally unjuſt and miſchievous. Conſequently, he muſt appear in the higheſt degree miſerable in the eyes of every one, who ſees things in a true light.

WHEN he had even arrived at the poſſeſſion of the ſovereign power, he was far from enjoying the pleaſure he had eagerly coveted: for though he was of a good family, and happy in having an univerſal acquaintance amongſt his equals; yet he did not confide in any of them; but choſe foreigners, ſavage barbarians, and a great number of ſlaves from the moſt wealthy families of Syracuſe for his life-guard. Thus he, in order, to preſerve an unjuſt power, condemned himſelf as it were to a kind of priſon. Nay, what is ſtill more, that he might not truſt his throat to a barber, he taught his own daughters to ſhave; ſo that theſe young princeſſes were reduced to ſo mean a function, as to be their

father's barber. Yet when they were grown up, he would not even truſt them with a razor; but taught them to ſinge his beard and hair with the burning coals of walnut ſhells.

He had two wives, Ariſtomache a native of Syracuſe, and Doris a Locrian. He never ſpent a night with any of them, till he had thoroughly ſearched all their apartments. A broad moat, over which was a ſmall wooden bridge, ſurrounded his bed-chamber, which drew up towards it on ſhutting the door.

He durſt not truſt himſelf to harangue the people in ſuch places as are moſtly uſed for that purpoſe; but uſed to do it from a high tower.

He was very fond of playing at tennis; one day when he was ſtripping for that purpoſe, he gave his ſword to a young man, who was his favourite. Upon which one of his intimate friends by way of jeſt ſaid, "here "then is one with whom you can confide

"your life;" upon which the young man ſmiling, he ordered them both to be put to death: the one, becauſe he had marked out a way to deprive him of life, and the other, for having approved of the hint by the ſmile. He, however, experienced more uneaſineſs at this action than ever he had done in his life; for he had a very great regard for the young perſon, whom he had cauſed to be put to death. Weak men are therefore diſtracted between oppoſite paſſions. If you ſatisfy the one, you muſt do it at the expence of the other.

WAS this man happy? The following ſtory ſhews in what condition he was: Damocles, one of his paraſites, having launched out in praiſe of his opulence, the number of his troops, his power, the magnificence of his palace, and all kinds of riches, and concluding that no perſon ever was ſo happy: "Will "you then," ſays the tyrant to Damocles, "taſte this life you are ſo pleaſed with, and "take a trial of my lot." With all my heart, ſays he: upon which he was placed on a ſo-

pha of gold with moſt ſplendid coverings, that were beautified with magnificent works of embroidery; ſeveral buffets were likewiſe ordered to be furniſhed with gold and ſilver plate of curious workmanſhip. Some very beautiful young ſlaves were ordered to wait at table; who were commanded to watch his very looks, and ſerve him at the leaſt ſignal. There were plenty of eſſences, garlands, and perfumes; and the moſt exquiſite viands covered his table. In ſhort, Damocles thought himſelf quite happy; when the tyrant, in the midſt of this entertainment, ordered a drawn ſword, of the brighteſt poliſh, to be ſuſpended from the ceiling, by a ſingle horſe-hair, juſt over the head of this man, who was ſo enchanted with his happineſs. From this inſtant his eyes are no more delighted with the beautiful attendants, and curious plate; the delicacies on the table were no longer ſought after, the garlands fell down of themſelves; in ſhort, he aſked permiſſion of the tyrant to retire, for that now he did not chuſe to be happy.

POMPEY has often related, that in returning from Syria, having put into Rhodes, he wanted much to hear Poſidonius's lectures; but being informed that he was very ill of a fit of the gout, he thought that the leaſt he could do, was to pay a viſit to ſo reputed a philoſopher. On being introduced, he ſaluted him in terms of the greateſt reſpect, and told him how ſorry he was, that he could not have the pleaſure of hearing him. "But you "may," replied Poſidonius, "for bodily pain "ſhall never be the reaſon why a perſon of "your rank ſhould wait on me to no purpoſe." So that although he was confined to his bed, he entered into a grave and eloquent diſcourſe on this very ſubject, "that nothing but what "is honeſt is good," and he often ſaid when the moſt acute touches of pain ſeized him, "pain, you act in vain; though you do trouble "me, I will never own that you are an evil."

CAN you find one philoſopher of a thouſand, whoſe manners and conduct are conformable to reaſon; who views his learning, not as a vain ſhew of ſcience, but a rule of

life; and maſter of his own actions, carries his doctrine into practice? Some of them are ſo full of their pretended merit, that it would have been more to their advantage if they never had learned any thing; others are avaricious, ſome fond of glory, and a number ſlaves to pleaſure: ſo that between their life and doctrine, there is a ſtrange contraſt; than which, nothing, in my opinion, can be more ſhameful. For ſhould a grammarian ſpeak improperly, or a muſician not ſing well, ſuch faults in them are ſo much the greater, as being committed againſt the very arts they profeſs. Therefore a philoſopher who leads a bad life, is the more to be diſdained, as being guilty of a breach of the morality he takes upon him to teach; and though to live virtuouſly in the art which he profeſſes, yet he errs in that very reſpect.

Should I, my Titus, eaſe you of that pain;
That anxious care, which fills your ſoul with grief:
Say, deareſt friend, would this not pleaſe you well?

For I may addreſs myſelf to you, Atticus, in the verſes ſpoken to Flamininus,

That man of honour, though but ſmall eſtate.

Although I know for certain, that you differ very much from Flamininus, and are not

Harraſſed both day and night with new alarms.

For I perfectly know your moderation, and evenneſs of temper. I am certain, that you have brought humanity and prudence from Athens, as well as a ſurname; and yet I cannot avoid imagining, that you are frequently affected with the ſame events as myſelf. But it is no eaſy affair to offer conſolation on this head, therefore we ſhall defer it to another time. I have at preſent given you my ſentiments on old age. For as it, I may ſay, hangs over us, or at leaſt approaches faſt, I want to make the burthen as light as poſſible to us both: although I am certain, that you not only bear it with prudence and moderation, as you do every thing elſe; but will

continue doing ſo. However, as I have choſen to write on this ſubject, I thought that a work, whoſe utility was common to us both, ſhould be offered to you.

I RECEIVED ſo much pleaſure in compoſing this treatiſe, that old age not only appeared to have nothing frightful about it, but even ſeemed eaſy and agreeable. What encomiums therefore are due to philoſophy: ſince the perſon, who follows its rules, may live happily in every part of his life! I have already mentioned its other advantages, and ſhall hereafter ſay a great deal. The book treats of old age which I have now ſent you.

I HAVE not made Tithonus ſpeak what I had to offer on my ſubject, as Ariſto of Chios did in the like caſe; (for much credit cannot be given to a fable) but M. Cato the elder, thereby to add authority to it. I introduce him making anſwer to Lelius and Scipio, who were aſtoniſhed that he ſo chearfully bore his age. If he ſhould ſeem to argue more

learnedly than is cuſtomary in his own works, attribute this difference to his knowledge of the Grecian literature, which he applied cloſely to in his latter years. But there is no long preamble neceſſary. Cato's diſcourſe will ſufficiently explain what I think of this ſubject.

ANY perſon may be deceived; but to be obſtinate, is the certain character of a fool.

WHAT is liberty? The power to live as you will. Now who is there that lives in this manner, if it be not one who is guided by right reaſon; who delights in his duty, and lives according to a plan founded on reflexion; who obeys the laws not through fear, but with ſubmiſſion and reſpect, becauſe he knows that his happineſs depends on it; who thinks, does, and ſays nothing, but with the greateſt chearfulneſs and good will. All his deliberations, and every thing he takes in hand, begin and end in himſelf, nor is there any thing has ſo much ſway with him, as his will and judgment; even fortune itſelf, with

all its great power, yields to him: for as the poet ſenſibly obſerves, "every perſon's for-"tune entirely depends on his manners." Thus we find it is the wiſe man alone, who never expoſes himſelf by doing any thing by force, or with regret.

We ſay in particular of an angry man, that every thing he does is void of prudence, reaſon, and reflection; which ſhould give laws to all the powers of the mind. Now it is proper, that the perſons againſt whom they level their fury ſhould be removed out of their ſight, till ſuch time as they recollect themſelves; (but what ſignifies recollecting ourſelves, provided we do not reſtore the diſturbed parts of the ſoul to their natural ſtate?) or they ſhould conjure and intreat this irritated perſon to ſuſpend his vengeance a little, till ſuch time as his anger has ſubſided. But this certainly muſt mean a violent perturbation raiſed in the mind contrary to reaſon. Hence we much admire the wiſe ſaying of Archytas; who being irritated at his ſtew-

ard, thus addreſſed him: "I ſhould have "treated you very ſeverely, had I not been in "a paſſion."

HIPPIAS having arrived at Olympia while thoſe famous games were celebrating, which are held every fifth year, and where almoſt all Greece were aſſembled, publickly boaſted, that he was perfectly maſter of geometry, muſic, grammar, phyſick, morality, and politicks, and that he not only poſſeſſed all the liberal arts; but that the ring he had on his finger, his cloak, and ſhoes were all made by himſelf.

THE famous Athenian Themiſtocles, whom the Greeks looked upon as a prodigy of good ſenſe and prudence, was accoſted by a very learned man, who offered to teach him that art of memory, the invention of which was very new. Themiſtocles having aſked him, what that art could do? The profeſſor replied, that it would teach him to remember every thing. I would rather chooſe, ſays The-

miſtocles, that you would teach me to forget, than remember every thing I would.

THEOPHRASTUS, when dying, is ſaid to have reproached nature, for having granted ſo long a life to ſtags and crows, who had no need for it; whilſt mankind had a very ſhort one, who might make a good uſe of it: for had they had a longer life, they might have been able to learn every art. He complained, therefore, that he was dying, when he was juſt beginning to be wiſe.

AN ungrateful perſon is hated by every body. By diſcouraging munificence, they think themſelves perſonally injured; and view the guilty perſon as the common enemy of all thoſe who are in want.

PYTHAGORAS having gone to Philus, is ſaid to have had a learned and very eloquent diſcourſe with Leon, king of that place; who being delighted with what he had heard, aſked him what was his trade? Pythagoras re-

plied, that he was a Philoſopher, and knew no trade at all. The King being ſtruck with the novelty of the term, enquired what Philoſophers were, and wherein they differed from the reſt of the human race? It is my opinion, replied Pythagoras, that human life reſembles that vaſt crowd of people who come from the moſt diſtant parts of Greece to celebrate the ſolemn games: for as in them, ſome, by bodily exerciſe, contend for the honour and glory of gaining the crown of victory; the only inducement of others, was to enrich themſelves by traffick: but there was alſo a third ſort, preferable to the reſt, who came thither neither for applauſe nor gain, but only to ſatisfy their curioſity, by ſeeing what was done, and in what manner things were conducted. In this manner do mankind come from another life, and another ſtate of exiſtence, into this world, as it were from a foreign city to ſome feſtival ſolemnity. Some endeavour to acquire glory; others are bent upon gathering riches; and ſome few carefully ſtudy the nature of things,

regarding every other purſuit as beneath their notice. Thoſe have aſſumed the appellation of Philoſophers, or, lovers of wiſdom. The ſtudy of nature is therefore as much ſuperior to every other profeſſion, as the being no more than an honourable ſpectator, free from mean ſelfiſh views, is in the public games.

FINIS.